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INTRODUCTION

For decades the courts have invoked the sham transaction doctrine
to deny legal effect to transactions which they believe to be fictitious
or not reflecting reality. The sham transaction doctrine has been one
of a number of approaches that the courts have utilized to combat tax
avoidance, along with the business purpose doctrine, the doctrine of
substance over form, the corporate entity doctrine, and the step trans* © 1989 Karen Nelson Moore.
** Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University Law School. A.B. 1970, J.D. 1973,

Harvard University. I wish to thank Carolyn Wheaton for her helpful research assistance.
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action doctrine. However, upon analysis of the cases that discuss or
invoke the sham transaction doctrine, it becomes apparent that this
doctrine is either duplicative or useless, a doctrine that permits courts
to engage in name-calling rather than thoughtful analysis. In other
words, either courts are engaging in analysis that is subsumed within
other judicial doctrines curtailing tax avoidance, or courts are simply
stating conclusions by labeling transactions as shams. Moreover, Congress has enacted remedial measures in many instances where courts
have invoked the sham transaction doctrine. Such legislative action
should be the primary mechanism to control tax avoidance. Courts,
in turn, should eliminate the sham transaction doctrine and address
inappropriate tax behavior through the use of other judicial doctrines
or through the application of legislative provisions. Simply labeling
behavior a sham transaction is not a worthy function and displaces
careful analysis.
Parts II and III of this article examine the development of the
sham transaction doctrine at the Supreme Court and lower federal
court levels. Analysis of the cases reveals three interrelated aspects
to the courts' development of the sham transaction doctrine. Fictitious
activity, lack of a business purpose or motive, and discrepancy between
the substance and form of the transaction have been the cornerstones
of sham transaction theory. Commentators have long questioned the
business purpose or motive test discussed in part IV. The fictitious
activity test is really an illustration in more egregious circumstances
of the importance of looking at the substance rather than the form of
the transaction. Thus, part IV argues that courts should recognize
the sham transaction doctrine for what it is or should be: an analysis
of substance over form, or alternatively, a requirement of economic
substance. Even with the understanding that the proper test is the
substance of the transaction test, however, courts must give content
to the test if it is to be useful. Thus, part V applies the substance of
the transaction test to a number of different situations in which courts
have previously invoked the sham transaction doctrine.
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHAM TRANSACTION DOCTRINE
AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
GREGORY, KNETSCH, AND FRANK LYON

Modern sham transaction jurisprudence draws heavily from three
Supreme Court cases, decided over a forty-three-year period, beginning with Gregory v. Helveringl in 1935. Although the Court in Gregory

1.

293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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did not explicitly use the word "sham," 2 it did develop several concepts
that subsequently have become critical elements of the sham transaction doctrine.
Gregory involved a taxpayer seeking to sell certain assets from a
corporation that she owned. Mrs. Gregory created a new corporation
and transferred the particular assets of the old corporation to the new
entity in exchange for all of its stock. She then liquidated the new
corporation, resulting in her receiving all of the assets in question.
Upon the sale of the assets she reported a net capital gain, producing
a lower tax than if she were taxed on receiving a dividend from the
old corporation. The Court refused to recognize this as a qualifying

reorganization .
In analyzing this transaction, the Court first recognized that tax4
payers could legitimately utilize legal means to reduce their taxes,
but that the critical inquiry was "whether what was done, apart from
the tax motive, was the thing which the statute intended." 5 The congressional intent behind the reorganization provisions involved in Gregory was to permit reorganization of corporate business. Therefore,
the Court concluded that a reorganization had to have some relation

2. The Supreme Court did not use the term "sham" anywhere in its opinion. It did, however,
use synonyms for sham, such as "device," "disguise," "contrivance," "masquerad[e]," and "artifice." Id. at 469-70. It is interesting that the Supreme Court did not use the term "sham,"
although Judge Learned Hand had in fact used the term in his opinion for the Second Circuit
below. The Second Circuit had concluded that
[a]ll these steps were real, and their only defect was that they were not what the
statute means by a 'reorganization,' because the transactions were no part of the
conduct of the business of either or both companies; so viewed they were a sham,
though all the proceedings had their usual effect.
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1934) (emphasis added).
3. 293 U.S. at 470. Gregory has been described and analyzed frequently. Particularly
thoughtful analyses include: Fuller, Business Purpose, Sham Transactions and the Relation of
Private Law to the Law of Taxation, 37 TUL. L. REV. 355 (1963); Rice, Judicial Techniques
in Combating Tax Avoidance, 51 MICH. L. REv. 1021 (1953). Both Fuller and Rice offer
devastating criticisms of the lack of content inherent in the Gregory tests described infra notes
4-9.
4. This was expressed more eloquently in Judge Hand's opinion for the Second Circuit,
which stated that
a transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its
immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one choose, to evade,
taxation. Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as
possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury;
there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes.
Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810.
5. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469.
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to the business of one of the corporations involved to qualify for favorable treatment. 6 This aspect of Gregory, requiring that there be some
business purpose for the transaction, has been termed the business
purpose doctrine 7 and is perhaps the aspect of Gregory most frequently
remembered. Inherent in this doctrine is a conflict, or at the least a
tension, between the principle that taxpayers may legitimately act to
reduce their taxes and the requirement of a business purpose. 8
Secondly, Gregory enunciated the principles that became the substance-over-form doctrine. The Court refused to give effect to the
purported reorganization because it was
a mere device which put on the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real character ....
The whole undertaking . . . was in fact an elaborate and
devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate
reorganization, and nothing else. The rule which excludes
from consideration the motive of tax avoidance is not pertinent to the situation, because the transaction upon its face
lies outside the plain intent of the statute. To hold otherwise
would be to exalt artifice above reality and to deprive the
statutory provision in question of all serious purpose. 9
This passage provides a basis for the development of the doctrine that
the substance, rather than the form, of a transaction should determine
its tax treatment. 10 The Court concluded that the substance of this
transaction was in effect the payment of a dividend since the corporation did not operate in reorganized form. Moreover, this passage provides a basis for the sham transaction doctrine. It characterized the
transaction as devious and a disguise of reality. The Court emphasized
this aspect of Gregory in later cases such as Helvering v. Minnesota
Tea Co., where the Court referred to Gregory as "reveal[ing] a sham
a mere device intended to obscure the character of the transaction.
We of course, disregarded the mask and dealt with realities."'1

6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 3, at 357; Gunn, Tax Avoidance, 76 MICH. L. REV. 733,
738 (1978). Fuller also describes Gregory as including the concepts of the sham transaction
doctrine and the doctrine of substance over form, as well as the business purpose doctrine.
Fuller, supra note 3, at 360.
8. See Gunn, supra note 7, at 738-40.
9. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469-70.
10. See, e.g., Gideon, Mrs. Gregory's Grandchildren:JudicialRestriction of Tax Shelters,
5 VA. TAx REv. 825, 830-31 (1986); Warren, The Requirement of Economic Projt in Tax
Motivated Transactions, 59 TAxEs 985 n.1 (1981).
11. 296 U.S. 378, 385 (1935). The Court in Minnesota Tea Co. distinguished the situation
there involved from Gregory on the ground that "[tihe present record discloses no such situation;
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Thus, when one examines Gregory, the interrelated threads of
reasoning weave a pattern: The transaction was not given effect for
tax purposes because it had no business purpose and because the form
of the transaction differed from its substance. Indeed, the form was
a disguise of the real substance.' These threads became three separate
strands: the business purpose doctrine, the doctrine of substance over
form, and the sham transaction doctrine, interrelated in some later
13
opinions but separately dealt with in others.
The second critical Supreme Court precedent giving shape to the
sham transaction doctrine was Knetsch v. United States, 4 decided in
1960. In this case, Mr. Knetsch had obtained a loan to purchase deferred
annuity savings bonds and then borrowed back the difference between
the indebtedness and the cash or loan value of the bonds. Since 'there
was nothing of substance to be realized" by the taxpayer and because
there was simply a "facade of 'loans,"' the Court concluded that the
transaction was a sham and the interest on the loan was nondeducti16
ble.
An insurance company had sold Knetsch deferred annuity savings
bonds which paid interest at 2 1/2 percent. Knetsch paid the company
a check for $4,000 and also signed a $4,000,000 nonrecourse note for
the remainder of the purchase price. The interest rate on the notes
was 3 1/2 percent, payable in advance; Knetsch prepaid the first year's

nothing suggests other than a bona fide business move." Id. The reorganization in Minnesota
Tea was respected because the taxpayer/seller acquired a definite and material interest in the
purchaser; it was not a mere device to camouflage a sale. Id. at 385-86.
12. According to Professor Chirelstein, Judge Hand's interpretation of Gregory simply
utilized a business purpose requirement to deter certain transitory legal arrangements; 'the
business purpose doctrine was thus in a sense an affirmation that form controls substance, but
with the qualification that the form adopted must be functional in some respect." Chirelstein,
Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440, 452 (1968).
Chirelstein believed that Judge Hand found '"notive an unacceptable test." Id. at 458-59.
Nonetheless, as discussed supra in text accompanying notes 6-8, others have viewed Gregory
as including a business purpose test as a major component.
13. Similarly, the commentators have emphasized one or another strand. See Blum, Knetsch
v. United States: A Pronouncement on Tax Avoidance, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 135, 144 & n.40.
Professor Blum quotes Randolph Paul's observation that "the case is all things to all men." Id.
at 144 n.40 (quoting R. PAUL, STuDIEs IN FEDERAL TAXATION 125 (3d ser. 1940)). Also, the

courts have cited Gregory for numerous principles against tax avoidance. A Lexis search in
1988 revealed over 1100 cases citing Gregory. Rice, supra note 3, at 1026, characterized Gregory
as a prime example of "[dlecision by [i]nvective and [u]nmeaningful [wiords." Fuller, supranote
3, at 366, noted the three strands of Gregory and worried that the sham transaction aspect was
"essentially contentless and subjective."
14. 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
15. Id. at 366.
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interest of $140,000 on the day he entered the agreement. Pursuant
to the contract, Knetsch could borrow at any time the excess of the
stated cash or loan value at year end over the amount of his indebtedness. Thus, within a week of entering the contract Knetsch borrowed
$99,000 of the $100,000 excess, and also prepaid the 3 1/2 percent
interest on this additional debt, or $3,465. Knetsch's total interest
payment as a result of the transaction was $143,465, which he sought
to deduct as interest paid during the taxable year. Knetsch repeated
16
this transaction format in the second and third contract years.
When Knetsch terminated the contract in the fourth year, his indebtedness totaled $4,307,000, and the cash or loan value of the bonds
was $4,308,000. Upon surrender of the bonds, the company cancelled
his indebtedness, and Knetsch received $1,000 in cash. Although the
contract had provided for a monthly annuity at maturity thirty years
later of $90,171, this amount was to be reduced by any borrowing
which reduced the cash or loan value. The borrowing pattern which
Knetsch engaged in, leaving only $1,000 as the difference between
the cash value and the indebtedness, would have reduced the annuity
amount to only $43 monthly, receivable beginning when Knetsch was
90 years old.
The district court found that Knetsch's only motive for the transaction was to obtain an interest deduction.' 7 Justice Brennan, writing
for the Court, refused to consider this finding because, as Gregory had
established, a taxpayer had a right to decrease his taxes by lawful
means. According to Gregory, "'the question for determination is
whether what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing
which the statute intended.'")18
With Gregory thus analyzed, Justice Brennan focused on "what
was done."' 19 In the two tax years involved, Knetsch had paid interest
to the insurance company of $294,570 and had received as loans
$203,000, a net expense to Knetsch of $91,570. Although "in form" 2
Knetsch had obtained an annuity contract with monthly payments of
$90,171 (or life insurance proceeds should he die before maturity), this

16. Id. at 363-64. More specifically, in the second year, interest of $143,465 was paid in
advance on the aggregate debt; Knetsch also borrowed the $104,000 difference between the

cash or loan value and his indebtedness and prepaid interest of $3,640 on this loan, producing
a total interest deduction of $147,105. The third year, using the same methods, Knetsch claimed

an interest deduction of $150,745. Id.
17. Id. at 365.
18. Id. (quoting Gregory, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935)).
19. Id. at 365.
20.

Id.
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was "a fiction ' 21 due to Knetsch's borrowing pattern which kept the
net cash value at $1,000. Knetsch's transaction "did 'not appreciably
affect his beneficial interest except to reduce his tax .
"... The
,22
Court's analysis was terse:
[I]t is patent that there was nothing of substance to be
realized by Knetsch from this transaction beyond a tax deduction. What he was ostensibly 'lent' back was in reality
only the rebate of a substantial part of the so-called 'interest'
payments. The $91,570 difference retained by the company
was its fee for providing the facade of 'loans' whereby the
petitioners sought to reduce their 1953 and 1954 taxes in
the total sum of $223,297.68. There may well be single premium annuity arrangements with nontax substance which
create an 'indebtedness' for purposes of. . . section 163(a)
'
But this one is a sham."
....
Thus, the Court denied the claimed interest deductions.
Analysis of the Court's opinion in Knetsch reveals several critical
themes of the sham transaction doctrine. First, the Court was concerned with the tension addressed in Gregory involving taxpayers'
motives; because taxpayers may properly act to decrease the amount
they owe in taxes, courts should disregard the tax motive and instead
determine whether the taxpayers' activity was what Congress intended. Second, the Court required that the taxpayer must obtain
something of substance from the transaction, some effect on a beneficial interest, beyond a tax consequence.2 Third, the Court utilized
such terminology as "form," "fiction," "ostensibly," and "facade" in
the course of reaching the conclusion that the particular transaction

21. Id. at 366.
22. Id. at 366 (quoting Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 411 (2d Cir. 1957) (dissenting
opinion of Learned Hand, J.)). For a discussion of Judge Hand's Gilbert dissent, see Chirelstein,
supra note 12, at 459-74.
23. 364 U.S. at 366.
24. Asimow, The Interest Deduction, 24 UCLA L. REV. 749, 788 (1977), identified Knetsch
as a substance over form case and stated that the difference between that test and the test of
appreciably affecting beneficial interests was not clear. Professor Blum argued that the Supreme
Court should not have run together the two concepts of appreciably affecting beneficial interests
and the substance of the transaction. Blum, supra note 13, at 152-53. He gave an example
where a taxpayer borrows at a high interest rate and invests at a lower interest rate. Here,
the transaction would appreciably affect his beneficial interests but would not have economic
substance because the transaction would not be economically sound. This example foreshadows
the problem of Tillie Goldstein, discussed infra in text accompanying notes 181-93.
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was a sham.2 Thus, in Knetsch, the sham transaction doctrine involved
fictive activity, where the reality differed from the form adopted by
2 6

the taxpayer.

It is interesting, in light of the majority's conclusion that the transaction was a sham, to consider the majority's use of Judge Learned
Hand's dissenting opinion in Gilbert v. Commissioner.2 Judge Hand
had rejected formulation of the test as substance over form, sham, or
substantial economic reality because he believed these were undefined
terms providing no guidance as to what factors would be determinative. Instead, Hand proposed a test that inquired if the taxpayers
"suppose[d] that the difference [between the choice of debt over contribution to capital] would appreciably affect their beneficial interests
in the venture, other than taxwise?"' Hand then emphasized the belief
of the taxpayer that his beneficial interests would be affected. Justice
Brennan, in Knetsch, however, recast this as a more objective test.
He questioned whether the taxpayer's beneficial interests were affected and dropped the state of mind component of Hand's formulation.
Moreover, Brennan's approach explicitly endorsed an analysis of substance over form and used the terms "fiction" and "sham" to label the
transaction as one whose form did not warrant respect. Unfortunately,
Justice Brennan failed to give content to these tests. He also failed
to analyze specifically why the transaction did not appreciably affect
beneficial interests or have substance such that its form should be
recognized. Finally, he failed to indicate how to measure these factors.2

25. Knetsch, 365 U.S. at 365-66. This raises an important point: whether the Supreme
Court is involved in review of a finding of fact or a standard of law. See Blum, supra note 13,

at 141-43. In the context of the sham transaction doctrine, the legal question concerns the
appropriate standards for determining that a type of transaction is a sham; the question of fact

is whether the particular transaction falls within those legal parameters. See Estate of Franklin
v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1047 n.3 (9th Cir. 1976).
26. Fuller, supra note 3, at 370-71, concluded that Knetsch involved real activity by the
taxpayer and that there was economic significance to the transaction (payment of money by the
taxpayer and receipt of income by the payee) but that the key to the Court's conclusion in
Knetsch was the total absence of economic purpose, making Knetsch as well as Gregory easy
cases.
27. 248 F.2d 399, 410 (2d. Cir. 1957) (Hand, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 412.
29. The decision is frequently criticized for its lack of content. See, e.g., Blum, supra note
13, at 149-51. Professor Blum worried that after Knetsch the sham transaction doctrine would
be used as a label for the result that the taxpayer loses. Id. at 157. But note that Professor
Blum also commented that 'judicial vagueness may also have a place in coping with the avoidance
problem" and preferred this to "an ever-growing crop of detailed statutory enactments tailored
to stop specific minimization schemes." Id. at 158.
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The dissent in Knetsch, espoused by Justice Douglas, adopted a
narrower view of what constituted a sham transaction. According to
this position, "as long as the transaction itself is not hocus-pocus, the
interest charges incident to completing it would seem to be deductible." 30 Neither the presence of a dominant motive of tax avoidance
nor the absence of commercial substance make the transaction a sham.
Since the "transactions were real and legitimate in the insurance
world," 31 courts should respect them for tax purposes, unless Congress
specifically legislates otherwise. Hence, the dissenting view significantly limited the sham transaction doctrine and would invoke it only
in situations where transactions were intended to deceive.
The third Supreme Court case giving shape to the sham transaction
doctrine was Frank Lyon Co. v. United States.,? Taxpayer Frank
Lyon Co. (Lyon) entered into a sale and leaseback transaction with
a state bank (Worthen). Pursuant to the agreement, Worthen sold a
building as it was constructed to Lyon. Lyon then leased the completed
building back to Worthen under a net lease arrangement. The total
rent payable over the term of the lease equaled the principal and
interest necessary to amortize a third-party loan which was obtained
to finance construction of the building. Lyon sought to deduct interest
paid on the mortgage loan and depreciation on the building. The Commissioner denied these deductions on the theory that Lyon was not
the owner of the building, that the sale-leaseback arrangement was
actually a loan by Lyon to Worthen of $500,000 (the excess of the
price which Lyon paid Worthen for the building over the amount of
the mortgage loan), and that Lyon was merely acting as a conduit for
Worthen's payments of principal and interest on the mortgage loan
from the third party. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Blackmun, concluded that the transaction was not a sham and should
be given effect.3 4
The elements of the sham transaction test utilized in Frank Lyon
again drew from specific doctrinal patterns. Justice Blackmun began
his analysis with discussion of the substance over form doctrine, requir-

30. Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 370 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justices Whittaker and Stewart
joined. The dissent did not define what it meant by hocus-pocus, nor did it give meaningful
standards. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines hocus pocus as "sleight of hand" or
"nonsense or sham used esp[ecially for] deception." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 574 (9th ed. 1983).
31. Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 371.
32. 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
33. Id. at 568-69.

34.

Id. at 580.
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ing an analysis of "the objective economic realities of a transaction
rather than . . . the particular form the parties employed."-" Thus,
the inquiry in a sale-leaseback case should not stop at the transfer of
formal title. It should evaluate whether the transferor retained significant control over the property transferred. The Court emphasized
that this transaction involved a third party because of banking law
restrictions, that Lyon was obligated on the mortgage notes, and that
the arrangement significantly affected Lyon's financial situation. The
fact that tax laws helped to shape the transaction was not dispositive;
Lyon had also engaged in other activities apart from holding the title
to the building. Thus, the Court concluded that the transaction was
not "a simple sham. 3 6 Further analysis of the facts led the Court to
conclude that Lyon was both the obligor on the loan and the "one
whose capital was committed to the building. ' ' 37 For these reasons,
the Court approved of Lyon's deductions for interest payments made
and for depreciation on the building.
In a subsequent portion of the opinion, after concluding that the
transaction was not a simple sham, the Court further investigated
what it termed the "substance and economic realities of the transaction."-' After detailing the unique facts of the case, the opinion concluded:
we hold that where, as here, there is a genuine multiple
party transaction with economic substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped
solely by tax avoidance features that have meaningless labels
attached, the Government should honor the allocation of
rights and duties effectuated by the parties. Expressed
another way, so long as the lessor retains significant and
genuine attributes of the traditional lessor status, the form
of the transaction adopted by the parties governs for tax
purposes." 39
Here, the Court intertwined the concepts of economic substance and
business purpose in assessing the validity of the transaction for tax
purposes.
This separate consideration reveals the Court's belief that two
levels of analysis were necessary. First, the Court analyzed the trans-

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

573.
580.
581.
582.
583-84.
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action to determine if it was a simple sham. After passing the test

for a simple sham transaction, the next level of analysis was a combination of the substance over form and business purpose tests. Interestingly, the Court did not once cite or discuss Gregory or Knetsch in
analyzing the sham transaction doctrine. The Court did not make clear
why two levels of analysis were necessary. At bottom, the Court
should have respected the transaction if it had substance; i.e., if Lyon

were the true owner of the building, it should be entitled to depreciation deductions.40 An emphasis on the substance of the transaction
would properly divert attention from the labeling aspect of the sham
transaction doctrine and from the vagaries of the business purpose
doctrine. 41 It would also be consistent with the thrust of the factors
discussed and the language of Frank Lyon that emphasized the sub-

stance of the transaction.
These three cases reflect the Supreme Court's attempt to use the
sham transaction doctrine to combat tax avoidance. Tax avoidance, of
course, takes many forms,4 and courts must tailor weapons precisely
to eliminate particular abuses. Moreover, courts should recognize that
the sham transaction doctrine is simply one of a series of judicial
doctrines developed to fight tax avoidance, 43 any number of which may
be relevant in any given situation.

40. See generally Wolfman, The Supreme Court in the Lyon's Den: A Failure of Judicial
Process, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (1981) (criticizing a number of aspects of FrankLyon and
urging that the key analysis should have been "the characteristics that distinguish the investment
of an owner from that of a lender." Id. at 1088.).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 93-107.
42. See generally Cooper, The Taming of the Shrewd: Identifying and ControllingIncome
Tax Avoidance, 85 COLul. L. REV. 657 (1985) (an innovative effort to develop an understanding
of what constitutes tax avoidance, based on efficiency and equity concerns); Gideon, supra note
10, at 849-53 (explanation of how tax shelters work); STAFF OF JOINT COAM. ON INTERNAL
REVENUE TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 1ST, SESS., OVERVIEW OF TAX SHELTERS (Comm. Print
1975) [hereinafter OVERVIEW] (prepared for the use of the Committee on Ways and Means,
Overview discusses the elements of tax shelters and possible approaches to limit their use). The
basics of tax shelters involve deferral, transforming ordinary income into capital gains or other
income taxed at lower rates, and the use of leverage (someone else's money) to maximize tax
advantages. OVERVIEW at 1; Gideon, supra note 10, at 849-53. Tax avoidance may also involve
attempts to secure favorable rates or to avoid taxation entirely, in situations where Congress
has not so intended. Professor Cooper urged the removal of tax incentives for leverage as a
comprehensive measure to reduce tax avoidance. Cooper, supra, at 715-18. Cooper decried the
patchwork effect created by ad hoc measures. He also recommended elimination of rate differentials between corporations and high bracket taxpayers and elimination of differentials leading
to intrafamily and trust transfers, as measures to curtail the need for what he called "dozens
of existing damage-control rules." Id. at 725-26.
43. See Gunn, supra note 7.
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It is unfortunate, however, that following the decision in Frank
Lyon, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the sham transaction
doctrine has remained quiescent. The Court has left fashioning of
refinements of the doctrine and determination of what situations fit
within its framework to the lower courts. Part III below focuses on
these recent lower court decisions and demonstrates the variety of
approaches these lower courts have followed.
III.

MODERN SHAM TRANSACTION JURISPRUDENCE:
DEVELOPMENT IN THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS

The imprecision and ambiguity inherent in the Supreme Court's
development of the sham transaction doctrine afforded the lower courts
ample freedom to develop meaningful tests to guide analysis. Unfortunately, lower courts all too often miss this opportunity, with many
simply repeating the key phrases from the Supreme Court opinions
and reaching conclusions summarily.
The best-known effort in the lower courts to shape the sham transaction doctrine stems from the decision in Rice's Toyota World, Inc.
v. Commissioner" in 1985. In this case involving a sale-leaseback of
a computer, the Fourth Circuit adopted a test that the Tax Court
developed to implement Frank Lyon: "To treat a transaction as a
sham, the court must find that the taxpayer was motivated by no
business purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the
transaction, and that the transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable possibility of a profit exists." 4" Both the Tax Court
and the Fourth Circuit in Rice's Toyota World interpreted Frank
Lyon as establishing a two-part test for a sham transaction. The test
inquires into the existence of a business purpose for the transaction
and evaluates the economic substance of the transaction. The latter
evaluation is to be guided by a more precise test of whether there is
a reasonable possibility of a profit. Only if neither test were satisfied
would the transaction be considered a sham transaction.
In Rice's Toyota World, the taxpayer (Rice's), an auto sales company, purchased a used computer from Finalco, a corporation engaged
heavily in leasing capital equipment. Rice's gave Finalco a recourse
note of $250,000 and two nonrecourse notes totaling $1,205,227 for a
total of $1,455,227. Finalco had previously purchased the computer
for $1,297,643. Following their acquisition of the computer, Rice's

44.
45.

752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985), affg in part, rev'g in part, 81 T.C. 184 (1983).
752 F.2d at 91.
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leased it back to Finalco for eight years. Finalco was obliged to pay
rent to Rice's in an amount that exceeded Rice's obligations on the
nonrecourse notes by $10,000 annually. Although this obligation was
contingent upon Finalco's subleasing of the computer, at the time of
the agreement, Finalco had already obtained a five-year sublease.
After five years, Finalco was to receive thirty percent of the proceeds
of any further leasing or sale. Rice's sought deductions for accelerated
depreciation on the computer and deductions for the interest paid on
the notes. The Tax Court denied these deductions on the grounds that
46
the sale-leaseback transaction was a sham.
The Fourth Circuit evaluated the transaction by applying the twopart test separately. First, the court analyzed the subjective question
of the taxpayer's motives in entering the transaction. Rice's sole reason
for entering the transaction was to obtain tax deductions. Thus, the
circuit court affirmed the Tax Court's finding that Rice's lacked a
47
subjective profit motive for engaging in the transaction.
The second part of the test adopted in Rice's Toyota World was
termed objective: whether a reasonable possibility of profit from the
transaction existed apart from the tax benefits. The Fourth Circuit
evaluated the evidence introduced at trial and upheld the Tax Court's
finding of no reasonable possibility of profit. This court viewed this
aspect of the inquiry as an objective test which required determination
4
of whether the transaction had economic substance. 8

46. Id. See also 81 T.C. 184 (1983) (for the Tax Court opinion).
47. 752 F.2d at 92-94. The Fourth Circuit evaluated the Tax Court's conclusion that the
transaction was a sham under the "clearly erroneous" standard of review applicable to deteriinations of fact. Looking at the record, the Fourth Circuit found sufficient evidence that Rice's
did not investigate the transaction enough to support a conclusion that there had been a profit

motive. Moreover, the Finalco literature emphasized the tax reduction potential, Rice's paid on
inflated price for the used computer, and the use of nonrecourse notes was found to permit

abandonment of the transaction when the tax benefits due to accelerated depreciation waned
in later years. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed as not clearly erroneous the Tax Court's finding

of no profit motive. Id. at 94.
48.

Id. at 94-95. The Fourth Circuit's analysis turned on the residual value of the computer

at the end of the eight-year lease, since that would be the primary mechanism for Rice's to
recoup its investment in principal and interest on its recourse note. The Fourth Circuit accepted
as not clearly erroneous the Tax Court's conclusion that the experts of the Commissioner were

more credible than those of the taxpayer, and that therefore the residual value was not adequate
to permit a profit, thus causing the transaction to fall the economic substance part of the test
for a sham transaction. Id. at 95. See infra notes 103-05 (regarding the difficulties of relying

on the presence of profits as the sole determinant of whether to give a transaction effect for
tax purposes).
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Because neither a business purpose nor economic substance existed,
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the holding that the transaction was a
sham. 49 This result permitted the Commissioner to ignore the form
adopted by the parties and to follow the substance of the transaction
for tax purposes. The decision that Rice's had not really purchased a
computer but rather had paid a fee to Finalco to obtain tax benefits
resulted in the denial of depreciation deductions and interest deductions based on the nonrecourse loans. With respect to the interest
paid on the recourse note, however, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
the situation was fundamentally different. The taxpayer had incurred
a genuine debt upon which it made legitimate interest payments. Although the taxpayer subjected itself to this interest expense in order
to reduce taxes (a tax avoidance motive), under the Fourth Circuit's
interpretation of Frank Lyon, the court had to respect that part of
the transaction because it had economic substance.w
A number of courts have adopted the Rice's Toyota World
framework in the four years since its formulation. In Bail Bonds By
Marvin Nelson, Inc. v. Commissioner,51 the Ninth Circuit determined
that a transaction involving a reinsurance agreement and connected
loans was a sham because it failed to have either a business purpose
or any economic substance.52 On the other hand, the Tax Court in
Estate of Thomas v. Commissioners concluded that both tests of
Rice's Toyota World were satisfied in a computer leasing arrangement . 4 The Rice's Toyota World framework has formed the basis for
lower court analysis of transactions involving a variety of other situations, including purchases of masters for reproduction and cattle
feed transactions.6

49. 752 F.2d at 96.
50. Id. at 95-96.
51. 820 F.2d 1543 (9th Cir. 1987).
52. Id. at 1550.
53. 84 T.C. 412 (1985).
54. Id. at 437. Other cases applying the Rice's Toyota World framework in the computer
sale and leaseback situation include Johnson v. United States, 11 C1. Ct. 17 (1986); Larsen v.
Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1229 (1987); Torres v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 702 (1987); Mukerji v.
Commissioner, 87 T.C. 926 (1986).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Music Masters, 621 F. Supp. 1046 (W.D. N.C. 1985) (purchase
and lease of master sound recordings); United States v. Philatelic Leasing Ltd., 794 F.2d 781
(2d Cir. 1986) (purchase and sale of stamp masters).
56. See, e.g., Packard v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 397 (1985) (utilizing the Rice's Toyota
World framework in a cattle feed operation case to conclude that the transaction was not a
sham, but then applying the step transaction doctrine to recast the transaction as a partnership,
ignoring the intermediate corporate steps).
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Although a number of decisions as described have utilized the
criteria outlined in Rice's Toyota World, a number of others have
emphasized differing aspects in the analysis and application of the
sham transaction theory. The alternative formats take several forms.
One approach appears to merge a focus of whether the form of the
transaction accurately reflects the reality, with some reference to the
absence of business purpose. An example of this approach is the Tax
Court's "sham in substance doctrine," developed in Falsettiv. Commis7

sioner.5

Falsettidefined a "sham in substance" as 'the expedient of drawing
up papers to characterize transactions contrary to objective economic
realities and which have no economic significance beyond expected tax
benefits." This approach focused on the substance over form doctrine,
asking whether the reality of the transaction had economic significance.
The Falsetti court questioned whether there was in fact a sale of
property to the taxpayers' partnership. In concluding that the transaction was not a sale, the Tax Court looked at the failure of legal title
to pass, the lack of arm's-length dealings, the gross excess of the
stated purchase price over the fair market value, the failure of the
parties to treat the transaction in a manner consistent with the transfer
of ownership, and the complete disregard for the terms of the written
contract.69 However, the Tax Court also stated that in order to conclude that the transaction was a sham, it needed to determine whether
the taxpayers had a nontax purpose for entering into the transaction.2°
Because the taxpayers had not ascertained the fair market value of
the property, had not protected their interest in the property, had
not asserted control over the property, and did not determine that
their interests were disposed of at a fair price, the Tax Court determined that they had not established a business purpose for the transaction. 1 Thus, the court concluded,
considering the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the purported sale transactions, we conclude that
petitioners engaged in the expedient of drawing up papers
to characterize the transactions in question as something
contrary to the economic realities thereof, solely to obtain
unallowable tax benefits. What pretended to be a sale was
really a loan by the individual petitioners . . . on which

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

85 T.C. 332 (1985).
Id. at 347.
Id. at 348-49.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 354.
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10-percent annual interest was ultimately paid. Petitioners
had no interest in the property, which at all times remained
under the dominion and control of Harris. In short, what
we have before us is in substance a sham, the expected tax
benefits of which will be disregarded.6
This language, while focusing on the substance of the transaction, also
included some determination by the court that a business purpose was
lacking.
The Tax Court has utilized this approach emphasizing the substance
of the transaction and the "sham in substance" theory in other cases as
well. For example, in Brown v. Commissioner,6 the Tax Court considered a situation in which the taxpayer sustained losses by cancelling
a series of forward contracts for mortgage certificates. The court determined that these losses were "factual shams" 64 rather than the
result of bona fide transactions. In reaching its conclusion, the court
noted that all of the forward contracts involved the promoter and
taxpayer or other similar investors. It also noted that each investor,
including taxpayer, gave a power of attorney to the promoter permitting the promoter to control the contracts fully. Additionally, the
promoter could manipulate the profits on the transactions. Finally,
the court found the investment involved no risk, which is unusual in
legitimate straddles.6 However, in reaching the conclusion that these
transactions were factual shams, the Tax Court once again made passing reference to the business purpose component: "the disputed transactions constituted 'factual shams' which were inspired, designed, and
executed by [the promoter] . . . for the sole purpose of attempting
to achieve tax losses for their investors." Finally, the court stated
where
that the statutory provisions regarding straddles did not 6apply
7
the "alleged straddles ... are in fact fake or fictitious.

62. Id. at 355.
63. 85 T.C. 968 (1985), affd sub nom. Sochin v. Commissioner, 843 F.2d 351 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 72 (1988).
64. Id. at 1000. In a subsequent case, Glass v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1087 (1986), affd
sub nom. Yosha v. Commissioner, 861 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1988), the Tax Court tried to explain
both the sham in substance and factual sham tests. Sham in substance was defined as "simply
a mislabeling of what actually occurred," whereas factual shams were described as "those situations where the taxpayer does not establish the jural relationship he purports to create." 87
T.C. 1087, 1176 (1986). In other words, shams in substance occur when the substance differs
from the form, and factual shams are fictitious activities. The latter can be viewed as an example
of one type of the former.
65. 85 T.C. at 998-99.
66. Id. at 998, 1000.
67. Id, at 1000.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol41/iss4/1

16

Moore: The Sham
Doctrine:
An Outmoded and Unnecessary Approa
SHAM Transaction
TRANSACTION
DOCTRINE

Many of the sham transaction cases have involved conclusions by
the courts that the undertaking was a fiction. A number of appellate
courts have affirmed the Tax Court decision in Forseth v. Commissioner holding that a series of transactions involving commodity straddles were "factual shams"6 because the taxpayers had simply paid a
fee to purchase fictitiously generated tax losses. The Tax Court enumerated six factors demonstrating the sham nature of the transactions:
the correlation of the taxpayers' tax needs and the amount of losses
produced by the promoter; the ability of the promoter to predict the
amount of losses; the willingness of the promoter to trade before the
taxpayers had made margin deposits (indeed, no margin calls were
made at all); the closing out of taxpayers' gains to ensure that their
overall losses equalled their margin deposits; the failure to produce
any evidence of entry into opposite positions; and the manipulation of
trading records. The Tax Court concluded that "the real role of [the
promoter] was to contrive and/or manipulate an unregulated and unpublished market in gold and platinum forward contracts so that it
could deliver to its investors the losses promised by its fee-splitting
American liaison." 69 This constituted
factual shams, inspired, designed, and executed by [the
promoter]... for the sole purpose of achieving for its investors capital and ordinary losses to offset their unrelated income in 1980 and 1981. Petitioners have failed to prove that
there was any actual gold or platinum, that there was any
real market or trading, or that there was any purpose, other
than the avoidance of taxes, for any of the transactions in
issue.70
Hence, the Tax Court chose to focus on the substance of the transactions. However, the court also mentioned in conclusion that the sole
purpose for the transactions was to avoid taxes.
In affirming the Tax Court's decision in Forseth, several appellate
courts emphasized the fictitious nature of the transactions. The
Seventh Circuit in Forseth v. Commissioner characterized the transactions as "artifice, the essence of which was the sale of bogus tax
losses to appellants for a fee." 7' The Ninth Circuit affirmed in Enrici
v. Commissioner on the grounds that the Tax Court decision that "no
real transactions were taking place"' was not clearly erroneous and
68. 85 T.C. 127 (1985), affd in a number of cases. See infra notes 71-75.
69. Id. at 165.
70. Id.
71. 845 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1988).
72. 813 F.2d 293, 295 (9th Cir. 1987).
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that "the parties were merely rigging paper prices, losses, and gains
to effectuate a sale of generated tax losses." Thus, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the straddles were "artificial" rather than "real." 74 The
Sixth Circuit, in Mahoney v. Commissioner, noted that not only were

the transactions fictitious, but also that the taxpayer had no motive
in entering the investment except tax avoidance7 s
In a number of cases, the courts have examined the substance of
a transaction and concluded that the transaction was contrived or
unreal and, therefore, a sham. The decision of the Seventh Circuit in
Saviano v. Commissioner7 6 illustrates this approach. The court concluded that the economic substance of a purported loan arrangement
was really a joint investment and disregarded the loan as a sham.77
Focusing on the economic substance, on the actual transaction rather
than the form, the court viewed the taxpayer's action as a "ruse," a
"transparent attempt" using "misleading terminology" to obtain a desired tax deduction7 s Other courts similarly have addressed the substance of a transaction and concluded that it was a sham, concurrently
using terms such as "not bona fide," 9 bogus, ° artifice,"' phony,2 or
pretended8 to describe the arrangement. 84
73. Id. at 296.
74. Id.
75. 808 F.2d 1219, 1220 n.2 (6th Cir. 1987). Other circuits affirmed without published
opinion. Bramblett v. Commissioner, 810 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1987); Wooldridge v. Commissioner,
800 F.2d 266 (11th Cir. 1986).
76. 765 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1985); see infra notes 292-94 and accompanying text.
77. Id. at 650.
78. Id. The court focused on such factors as inadequate capital, allocation of risk, and
control by the borrower of repayment as demonstrating that this nonrecourse loan was not a
normal loan but rather a joint venture. The court believed that "only a fool would actually
believe that the transactions did in fact occur as described. The many elements of commercial
surrealism present in these tax shelters .. ." made it clear that it was a sham. Id. at 654.
79. Cases using the term "not bona fide" include: Price v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 860 (1987)
(describing transactions involving Treasury bill straddles as "fictitious," "bookkeeping legerdemain," "playing a football game without the football," "not bona fide," and "contrived." Moreover,
even if the transactions were not fictitious, the court concluded that they lacked economic
substance since there was no possibility of realization of any economic gain); Thompson v.
Commissioner, 631 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1980) (describing sale of property at vastly inflated price
as revealing transaction was not bona fide, lacked economic substance, and was a sham); United
States v. Atkins, 661 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that test for sham transaction is
linked with economic substance, there must be a bona fide transaction, and substance rather
than form controls); Brown v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 968 (1985) (concluding that transactions
involving forward contracts were not bona fide, but rather were fake or fictitious and thus were
factual shams).
80. See, e.g., Forseth, 845 F.2d at 746 (straddle was an "artifice," involving sale of "bogus"
tax losses, and therefore a sham lacking economic substance).
81. See, e.g., id. at 749.
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One approach focused on the taxpayer's intent in undertaking the
transaction to have the substance of the arrangement correspond to
its form. For example, in Boyter v. Commissioner," the Fourth Circuit
quoted at length from Gregory in concluding that the key question
was taxpayer intent. "[T]he sham transaction doctrine may apply in
this case if, as the record suggests, the parties intended merely to
procure divorce papers rather than actually to effect a real dissolution
of their marriage contract." This inquiry focused on the taxpayer's
intent to have the form diverge from the real substance of the situation,
resulting in an interesting combination of the purpose or intent test,
and the substance over form doctrine. However, the Fourth Circuit
decided Boyter prior to the emergence of the Rice's Toyota World
concept, which arguably represents its current theoretical approach.
Another approach taken by some courts links the sham transaction
doctrine with an evaluation of other substantive law questions. Several
cases in which the taxpayer has made an invalid attempt to assign
income through the use of a trust and where the taxpayer failed to
satisfy grantor trust provisions in the Internal Revenue Code represent a prime example of this approach 7 In these instances, the sham
transaction doctrine generally duplicates more carefully tailored approaches and must not conflict in any way with the statutory plan
selected by Congress. Another case illustrating this linkage approach
is F.P.P. Enterprises, Inc. v. United States,8 where the court held

82. See, e.g., Milbrew v. Commissioner, 710 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1983) (where plant sold at
greatly inflated price, where sale not at arm's-length and treated informally, and where strong
tax avoidance motive, sale was a 'phony" and sham transaction doctrine applied).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Clardy, 612 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1980) (a loan was "pretended"
to permit taxpayer to pay interest; this was nothing but an illusion, created by check swapping,
for sole purpose of creating an interest deduction, with no intent to complete the transactions;
hence sham transaction doctrine applied).
84. Some of these cases discussed in notes 79-83 supra also discuss the taxpayer's motive,
"s well as focusing on the substance of the transaction.
85. 668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981). See infra notes 279-82 and accompanying text. Boyter
involved taxpayers who were husband and wife who obtained a Haitian divorce at the end of
a tax year, remarried soon in the next tax year, then redivorced in the Dominican Republic at
the end of the second tax year and remarried once again after the second tax year closed, all
for the sole purpose of reducing the added tax caused by the marriage penalty in the rate
structure.
86. 668 F.2d at 1387 (emphasis added). Boyter was remanded to the Tax Court for a factual
determination of whether the transaction was a sham transaction under the principles outlined
by the Fourth Circuit. No opinion on remand was reported.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Buttorff, 761 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1985); Holman v. United
States, 728 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1984); Hanson v. Commissioner, 696 F.2d 1232 (9th Cir. 1983).
88. 830 F.2d 114 (8th Cir. 1987). See infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
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a transfer of assets to a family trust was a sham transaction lacking
economic substance because the taxpayers continued to use the property as their own. The court also held the transfers to the trusts
fraudulent under state law., It is questionable whether state law
regarding fraudulent conveyances should be binding or even relevant
for federal tax determination.
The brief review of the cases decided by the lower courts utilizing
the sham transaction doctrine demonstrates that great uncertainty
exists concerning the meaning and application of the doctrine.
Moreover, many courts are merging a variety of complex concepts
without clarifying theoretical interrelationships. The courts tend to
use the sham transaction doctrine to label tax avoidance the courts
believe improper, without the analysis necessary to justify this label.
Finally, the varying relationships in different opinions among the business purpose doctrine, the substance over form doctrine, and the sham
transaction doctrine prevent predictability of analysis. A cohesive
analytical approach is needed.

IV. THE PROPER ANALYSIS:
EVALUATION OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TRANSACTION
Continuation of the sham transaction doctrine in its various forms
is unnecessary and unwise. The label "sham transaction" permits
courts to avoid analysis. The proper analysis involves focusing on what
the taxpayer is actually undertaking. In other words, what is the
economic substance of the transaction? If there is economic substance,
then the courts should respect the form of the transaction for tax
purposes. However, if the taxpayers are really attempting a transaction at variance with the form which they have adopted, then the
courts should reject the form and recharacterize the transaction for
tax purposes according to its actual substance.
This approach involves compressing the concerns variously labeled
by the courts as the sham transaction doctrine, the doctrine of substance over form, or the requirement of economic substance into one
consideration: what is the substance of the transaction? This substance
of the transaction approach will eliminate the use of the sometimes

89. 830 F.2d at 117; see also Carr Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 698 F.2d 952 (8th
Cir. 1983) (transfer of property to shell corporations was both a sham transfer and a fraudulent
conveyance under state law), affg, 539 F. Supp. 528 (D.S.D. 1982). The district court in Carr
had stated that the transfers were shams and therefore were attempts to defraud the United
States government in violation of the state's fraudulent conveyance statute. Carr,539 F. Supp.
at 531.
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conclusory label "sham," which is a value-laden term having no inherent meaning. It will also eliminate concern over the taxpayer's purposes, whether the taxpayer's purpose solely is to reduce taxes or
whether he has a business purpose for the transaction. The court may
still give separate consideration to the business purpose of the arrangement in limited circumstances.'9 The sham transaction doctrine essentially addressed the same concerns as the substance over form test,
yet the labeling aspect obscured or discouraged analysis. Because of
this fault, courts should refrain from the continued use of the historical
sham transaction doctrine. 91
The substance of the transaction inquiry requires more complex
analysis than a sham transaction test which limits shams to fictitious
or fake transactions. Although courts clearly will deny fake transactions tax effect under the proposed test because they lack substance,
non-fictitious transactions may also fail the proposed test where
analysis of the transaction reveals that the substance differs from the
form adopted. This article argues that the key to decision is the substance of the transaction. Scrutinizing fake arrangements under the
substance of the transaction test promotes analysis and avoids the
labeling aspect so often determinative in the sham transaction doctrine.2
The substance of the transaction approach also requires elimination
of an inquiry into the taxpayer's purpose or motive in undertaking a
transaction. 93 Because of the difficulties inherent in a state of mind

90. The most obvious use of the business purpose analysis will continue where Congress
has incorporated the concept in statute. Even the use of business purpose tests in statutory
provisions requires great care. See Fuller, supra note 3, at 389-93 (describing a number of
statutory provisions incorporating a state of mind analysis and urging "a fundamental reconsideration" of those statutes requiring that the taxpayer not have a primary purpose of tax avoidance; favoring the more objective business purpose test). Summers, A Critique of the BusinessPurpose Doctrine, 41 OR. L. REV. 38, 45-47 (1961), suggested statutes could be redrafted to
achieve the same results without including a business purpose component.
91. Cf. Asimow, supra note 24, at 784-93 (recognizing the interrelationship between the
tests of sham, substance over form, and business purpose).
92. But see Gideon, supra note 10, at 828 (urging the sham transaction be restricted to
fake transactions).
93. Professor Blum has provided an admirable foundation for the evaluation of state of
mind (purpose, motive and intent) in tax law. Blum, Motive, Intent, and Purpose in Federal
Ineome Taxation, 34 U. CHi. L. REV. 485 (1967). Borrowing from the criminal law, Blum
suggested that purpose addresses the question what the taxpayer sought to accomplish, intent
addresses the question whether the taxpayer desired the acts that occurred, and motive addresses
the question of why the taxpayer wanted to accomplish his action. Id. at 486-87, 494-95. Generally
tax law has focused on purpose, and rarely on motive, in part Blum argued because of the
maxim in Gregory that a tax avoidance motive does not make unlawful activity complying with
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analysis, it is desirable to eliminate the subjective element when such
an inquiry is unnecessary to the analysis. Clearly, state of mind
analysis involves difficulty in ascertaining and proving the existence
of a particular taxpayer's state of mind in a specific transaction.9' The
court can overcome this difficulty to a degree by generalizing to consider what the hypothetical average taxpayer's state of mind would
be in similar circumstances. Such analysis, however, would likely be
based on observation of external factors, such as the substance of the
transaction. 95 Hence, the more straightforward analysis eliminates the
state of mind concept and focuses instead on the substance of the
transaction.9
Other problems with the state of mind analysis include the lack of
precision inherent in such a standard. What level of nontax reduction
motive or purpose should the court require of a taxpayer to satisfy
the business purpose test? Should the business purpose be the dominant purpose? Should it be the primary purpose? Or should it merely
be a primary purpose? What does primary mean? Should the standard
differ from one tax avoidance setting to another, or from one aspect
of tax law to another, and if so, why? How do we determine a person's
primary purpose? These questions have long troubled courts and commentators.Y They have not been, nor can they be, conclusively resolved.
Another critical problem is how to determine when state of mind
analysis is relevant. Can the courts resolve the tension in Gregory

the Internal Revenue Code. Id. at 495. But see Gunn, supra note 7, at 744 n.40 (suggesting
distinctions between motive and purpose are irrelevant for tax avoidance analysis and that they
overlap with intent considerably).
94. See generally Blum, supranote 93, at 498-99 (judgments about an actor's state of mind
typically rest on inferences drawn from introspection); Summers, supra note 90, at 41 (findings
of fact with respect to taxpayer motivation are based on evidence which is easily manufactured).
The possibilities of self-serving statements by taxpayers as to their purpose, motive, or intent
are boundless. The difficulties of proof of contrary state of mind by the IRS are enormous. But
see Gunn, supra note 7, at 743 45 (suggesting difficulty of proof should not be determinative,
analogizing to laws to deter mugging despite difficulty of catching muggers).
95. See Blum, supra note 93, at 501-05. Summers, supra note 90, at 43-47, argued the
business purpose test is unnecessary, and a wholly objective test is sufficient.
96. Summers, supra note 90, at 47-48, even worried that the appreciably affecting beneficial
interests test adopted in Knetsch would be a substitute for analysis. The substance of the
transaction test must avoid that problem.
97. See Cooper, supra note 42, at 684-85. Blum, supra note 93, at 512, concluded that the
primary purpose test "cannot be made very precise, and it is workable only so long as a great
deal of vagueness is accepted." Id. See also Rice, supra note 3, at 104146 (concluding that the
business purpose rule is neither theoretically coherent nor uniformly applied).
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between allowing taxpayers to act legitimately to reduce their taxes
while still requiring a genuine business purpose for the transaction?9
If the business purpose test means simply that any business purpose
no matter how small is enough, then the doctrine loses force as a
weapon to combat tax avoidance because in most instances the taxpayer may argue some business purpose. If the court requires a more
convincing business purpose to counteract the taxpayer's motive of
tax reduction, the test conflicts with the principle that taxpayers may
act to reduce their taxes. A final example demonstrates the vagaries
of use of the business purpose doctrine: a taxpayer may choose to
invest in tax exempt rather than taxable bonds simply because of the
favorable tax rates, yet courts have not held this action impermissible
under a state of mind analysis.
Also significant is the interrelation of a state of mind or business
purpose test with congressional action. When Congress has enacted tax
benefits, courts should not punish taxpayers taking advantage of those
benefits. In many instances, specific tax provisions (such as incentives
for investment in low income housing) exist to encourage taxpayer
activity in particular areas. Taxpayers who engage in that activity
because of tax benefits have accomplished exactly what Congress desired. As we know from Gregory, taxpayers are entitled to use statutory provisions to minimize their taxes.9 Thus, state of mind analysis
would seem inapplicable in these situations. Alternatively, Congress
may have chosen specifically to limit tax benefits where taxpayers do
not have a business purpose or profit motive. For example, in the
section 183 hobby loss situation, Congress has limited deductions when
an activity is not engaged in for profit. 100 In those circumstances,
courts must operate within the statutory confines and attempt to interpret the statute according to congressional intent. An intermediate
situation exists when Congress has neither intended tax benefits to
flow nor specifically enacted a state of mind or business purpose component. The courts should resolve these cases through a substance of
the transaction analysis. The weaknesses and ambiguities inherent in
the state of mind test make the latter analysis counterproductive.

98. Gunn, supra note 7, at 748, urged that the use of tax avoidance motive cannot be
justified because we cannot distinguish those cases where a tax motive should apply from those
where it shouldn't, and stated that "distinctions between tax-motivated and other behavior [are
indefensible]." Id. at 765. See also Rice, supra note 3, at 1036-38, 1041-46 (generally criticizing
cases discussing taxpayer intent, and calling business purpose test akin to "decision by invective,"

"a doctrine of last resort," 'thoroughly unpredictable," and "too evanescent to be helpful").
99. See supra text accompanying note 4.
100.

I.R.C. § 183 (1989).
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Acknowledging many of the weaknesses inherent in state of mind
analysis, Professor Blum has urged that state of mind analysis generally becomes focused "on whether any non-tax goals or functions were
or plausibly could have been served by the action."11 This article goes
one step farther, however, and urges that it is not the non-tax objective
but rather the substance of the transaction that courts should analyze.
Courts should look at what is really occurring in the transaction,
rather than focusing on the taxpayer's goals or objectives. In many
cases, a particular factor will indicate that the form of the transaction
has substance, and that a hypothetical taxpayer has reasonable non-tax
(i.e., economic) objectives. However, the courts should focus on the
former question of substance absent specific directives from Congress
to inquire into the taxpayer's objectives, purpose, or motive. 102
Substance of the transaction analysis would also minimize the problem identified by Professor Warren as inherent in requiring some
economic profit in tax-motivated transactions. 0 3 Professor Warren's
dilemma was that if courts required simply some pre-tax economic
profit, the presence of trivial profits would validate transactions which
substantively were quite similar to those with zero profit or slight
loss. On the other hand, to require a reasonable profit or full market
return would be arbitrary and would ignore the role of capital markets
in setting relative prices in light of tax advantages. °4 Others have
characterized this problem as inherently insoluble. 05 But by focusing
on the variety of factors that a particular context makes important
for determining the substance of the transaction, the courts need not
rely entirely on some measure of pre-tax economic profit as the key
determinant in validating the form of a transaction.' °6 Economic profit
will simply be one of a series of factors that courts may evaluate in
a given context in determining what is the substance of the transaction.

101. Blum, supra note 93, at 523. He also distinguished two views of business purpose: an
objective test of what a reasonable businessman would do and a subjective state of mind inquiry
regarding the particular taxpayer. Id. at 524 n.106. He endorsed an objective evaluation of a
taxpayer's nontax goals and objectives, looking at external factors. Id. at 536-44.
102. This may be what Justice Brennan intended in Knetsch in his shift from Judge Hand's

inquiry in Gilbert, regarding the taxpayer's belief in an effect on beneficial interests, to the
Knetsch form looking directly at the effects on beneficial interests. See supra text accompanying
notes 27-29.
103. See generally Warren, supra note 10.
104. See id. at 987.
105. See Gideon, supra note 10, at 834-39. He urged inquiry into "magnitude and likelihood

of the profits which may be achieved in comparison to the size of the investment," although he
recognized that this formulation also triggered Professor Warren's objections. Id. at 837-38.
106. Cf. id. at 841 (inquiring whether ownership as opposed to a "not-for-profit" analysis
would better resolve these transactions).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol41/iss4/1

24

Moore: The Sham Transaction Doctrine: An Outmoded and Unnecessary Approa
SHAM TRANSACTION DOCTRINE

The substance of the transaction approach avoids the problems
inherent in state of mind analysis. However, if this approach is to
succeed, courts must make a careful analysis based on the nature of the
particular transaction involved to determine whether the realities of
the arrangement conform sufficiently to the form to give that form
effect for tax purposes. In other words, the courts must give content
to the substance of the transaction test in order to prevent that test
from deteriorating into the labeling exercise of the sham transaction
doctrine at its worst.'1° An analysis of the typical situations in which
courts historically have invoked the sham transaction doctrine is helpful in providing content to the substance of the transaction test. Such
an investigation takes place in part V below.
V.

ANALYSIS OF COMMON TAX SHELTER PROBLEMS,

COMPARING RECENT CASE LAw WITH THE PROPOSED
SUBSTANCE OF THE TRANSACTION TEST

The substance of the transaction test will permit courts properly
to analyze the wide variety of situations in which courts previously
have applied the sham transaction doctrine. In recent years sham
transaction cases have fallen into certain common factual scenarios
that generally involve:
(1) sale-leaseback situations;
(2) sale and ownership questions;
(3) interest deductions;
(4) family trust situations and gift-leasebacks;
(5) straddles; and
(6) other situations.
Courts could more appropriately resolve cases in each of these areas
under the substance of the transaction test. Use of sham transaction
terminology is unnecessary and potentially misleading.

107. See Rice, supra note 3, at 1028-32 (urging that the doctrine of substance over form
is unrealistic and unenlightening). Rice concluded that given the weaknesses of all the various tax
avoidance doctrines, the best solution was to ascertain and describe "what the courts have done
in fact" to try to develop some predictable patterns. Id. at 1051.
Moreover, form may sometimes be respected regardless of substance, as where the Internal
Revenue Code provides an election for taxpayers. See Gunn, supra note 7, at 746-47 n.44. Blum,
supranote 13, at 146-47, criticized the substance over form test for not providing clear guidelines
when form alone may be respected. However, his example, drawn from comparison between
wash sales losses and wash sales gains, could be handled by the observation that since Congress
explicitly limited wash sales losses but not wash sale gains, Congress has indicated its approval
of formal transactions in that particular context.
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Sale-Leaseback Situations

As discussed above in part II and part III, two of the most renowned
sale-leaseback cases, Frank Lyon Co. and Rice's Toyota World, were
key cases shaping the existing sham transaction doctrine. The Fourth
Circuit, in an effort to interpret FrankLyon Co., enunciated in Rice's
Toyota World a two-part test for a sham transaction. The court defined
a sham transaction as one in which there is both no business purpose
and no economic substance to the transaction. 10 As part III established
more fully, in Rice's Toyota World the Fourth Circuit and the Tax
Court both found that the taxpayer lacked a subjective profit motive
and that there was no reasonable possibility of profit. 1°9
Numerous other cases have analyzed the application of the sham
transaction doctrine in connection with the sale-leaseback phenomenon.
In surveying these cases, several distinctive elements become apparent. First, some cases have focused on the substance of the transaction
by ascertaining whether there was a realistic opportunity for economic
profit or other factors indicative of substance. 10 Indeed, the Claims
Court has equated the sham transaction doctrine with the test of
economic substance."" Second, some cases have focused on the burdens
and benefits of ownership, permitting tax benefits to flow only to
those who are also subject to the burdens of ownership.112 Third, some
cases have included an investigation of the taxpayer's purpose or motive: was there a business purpose or a profit-making intent? The
courts have viewed this factor as either a component of the sham

108. Rice's Toyota World, 752 F.2d at 91.
109. Id. at 95; 81 T.C. at 206.
110. See, e.g., Larsen v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1229 (1987); Torres v. Commissioner, 88
T.C. 702 (1987); Estate of Thomas v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 412 (1985); Hilton v. Commissioner,
74 T.C. 305 (1980), affd, 671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding sale-leaseback was a sham,
applying Frank Lyon, and emphasizing analysis of substance of transaction, especially noting
rent not based on fair market value, absence of taxpayer's own funds, inability of taxpayer to

dispose of property at profit, packaging as a tax shelter, and carelessness in arranging relevant
partnerships). Cf. Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976) (where

purchase price not shown to approximate fair market value but appeared to exceed it, substance
of transaction was not sale; court chose not to use "sham" but disallowed deduction on ground
of economic substance).
111. Johnson v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 17, 25 (1986). The Claims Court then proceeded
to quote Rice's Toyota World's two-part test favorably. Id.
112. See, e.g., Torres v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 702 (1987); Estate of Thomas v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 412 (1985). Note that the Ninth Circuit in Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner,
544 F.2d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 1976), speaks of an investment in property as a requirement for
depreciation, not just ownership.
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transaction doctrine,113 or in some cases, an entirely separate test
under section 183.114 A subissue is the quantum of profit motive required; some courts indicate that this inquiry varies, depending on
whether the courts view the issue as a component of the sham transaction doctrine or the for-profit requirement under section 183.115 Of
course, many courts have considered all factors in reaching a conclusion. 116
Illustrative of the multifaceted approach is Torres v. Commis1 7 in which the Tax Court upheld a computer sale and leaseback,
sioner,
analyzing the transaction in terms of three different tests. First, the
court applied the Rice's Toyota World test and concluded that because
the taxpayer had a reasonable chance of realizing an economic profit,
the transaction had economic substance and was not a sham. 118 Indeed,
the Tax Court concluded that a profit was virtually assured. Second,
the court concluded that the form of the transaction deserved respect
because the benefits and burdens of ownership had passed under the
arrangement. 19 Finally, the court determined the transaction satisfied
section 183(a) since the taxpayer had an intent to make a profit as
determined under the regulations. 0 Each of these components in Torres deserves careful scrutiny.
With respect to economic substance, the Tax Court continued to
rely on the Rice's Toyota World definition of sham transaction as the
key to analysis. Focusing on the reasonable possibility of economic
profit, the Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer was very likely to
profit economically from the transaction and hence the investment did
113. Rice's Toyota World, 752 F.2d 89; Levy v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. No. 54 (Nov. 2,
1988); Larsen v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1229 (1987); Mukerji v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 926

(1986); Estate of Thomas v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 412 (1985).
114. See Torres v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 702 (1987) (noting reference to Rice's Toyota
World business purpose component but focusing on economic substance).
115. See Estate of Thomas v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 412, 440 n.52 (1985) (simply requiring
more than de minimis potential for profit to meet purpose requirement of sham transaction
doctrine; referring to § 183 as "a closely related context"). But see Johnson v. United States,
11 Cl. Ct. 17, 25-28 (1986) (discussing profit standard under § 183 in sale-leaseback situations;
concluding that the profit requirement of § 183 does not apply with the same vigor in saleleasebacks as in hobby losses, and not requiring primary or dominant profit motive but requiring
more profit motive than necessary to withstand sham transaction, i.e., "reasonable in the circumstances").

116.

See, e.g., Levy v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. No. 54 (Nov. 2, 1988); Torres v. Commis-

sioner, 88 T.C. 702 (1987); Mlukerji v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 926 (1986); Estate of Thomas v.

Commissioner, 84 T.C. 412 (1985).
117.

88 T.C. 702 (1987).

118. Id. at 719.
119. Id. at 727.
120.

Id. at 734.
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have economic substance. 2 1 The court drew this conclusion from the
significant residual value of the computers at the end of the lease,
the excess of the expected contingent rent over the taxpayer's cash
payments within the initial three-year period, and the strong likelihood
of positive cash flow from the equipment in early years. This finding
meant that the court would respect the transaction for tax purposes;
it was not a sham under the Rice's Toyota World framework. 12
The second stage of analysis for the Tax Court in Torres concerned
whether the taxpayer had sufficient benefits and burdens of ownership
to qualify for deductions which were available only to true owners.
The key issue centered on relevant factors in determining ownership.
After outlining fourteen factors, the Tax Court focused on the evidence
in the record: the taxpayer paid the fair market value for the equipment; the expected useful life of the equipment exceeded the leaseback
term; and a significant residual value for the equipment would remain
at the end of the leaseback. Moreover, both parties had treated the
transaction as a sale, the lessee had a present obligation to make
rental payments, the cash flow arrangements (larger cash flow in early
years) were consistent with ownership, and the taxpayer had a reasonable possibility of both recouping the initial investment and earning
a substantial profit from the income and residual value of the equipment. Hence, the taxpayer possessed sufficient ownership attributes
to qualify as owner for tax purposes.2

121. Id. at 727-34.
122. Id. at 719. Another example is Mukerji v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 926 (1986), where
the court noted that the purchase price was at or less than fair market value, the residual value
was reasonable, and there was a virtually guaranteed cash flow. Mukerji, 87 T.C. at 957. Hence,
the court concluded that there was the opportunity for profit. Id. Similarly the court in Estate
of Thomas v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 412, 437, 439 (1985), found that a reasonable potential for
profit met the economic substance requirement. See also Levy v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. No.
54 (Nov. 2, 1988) (sale-leaseback transaction had a business purpose and economic substance
because petitioners owned the equipment, were at risk for the debt obligations, and entered
the transaction for profit). Cf. Larsen v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1229 (1987) (two transactions
met and two did not meet the economic substance standard based on evidence regarding the
purchase price, fair market value, residual value, and rental values).
123. See also Mukerji v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 926 (1986) (concluding that the taxpayer
retained significant benefits and burdens of ownership). These factors are really basically the
same as those involved in the sham transaction analysis. In Mukerji, the court also concluded
that there was genuine indebtedness supported by actual investment. Id. at 968 n.34; see also
Levy v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. No. 54 (Nov. 2, 1988); Larsen v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1229,
1266-68 (1987) (holding two transactions where taxpayer acquired benefits and burdens of ownership are recognized for tax purposes); Estate of Thomas v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 412, 433-36
(1985) (concluding that taxpayer retained significant benefits and burdens, looking at reasonable
rental payments, parties' treatment of lease, risks and benefits of ownership, e.g., residual value).
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Finally, the Tax Court in Torres turned to whether the taxpayer
had a bona fide intent to make a profit independent of tax benefits.'2
Here the Tax Court simply analyzed the requirements of section
183(a), which limits the allowable deductions if an activity-is not undertaken for profit. After citing the nine factors specified in the Regulations under section 183, the Tax Court focused on the substantial
profit expected and actually obtained by the taxpayer from the transaction. Moreover, the expected economic benefits were substantial
compared to the expected tax benefits. Indeed, the taxpayer expected
no net tax benefits at all. Thus, the taxpayer had a bona fide intent
to profit from the transaction, sufficient to meet the standard of section
183(a).m
This treatment contrasts interestingly with the analysis of the
Claims Court in Johnson v. United States. According to that court,
the profit test under section 183 should not weigh potential tax benefits. 127 Pursuant to section 183, a court must require more profits
than the "modicum" necessary to survive characterization as a sham:
"a profit reasonable in the circumstances should be anticipated to pass
muster under section 183."m The court articulated a test that would
require the "objective of, and a reasonable chance of making, a reasonable profit apart from tax considerations."' Of course, this level of
profit also would satisfy the sham transaction standard. Applying this
standard, the Claims Court examined the facts of the case and found
that an annual return of 6.27 percent was reasonably likely. Thus, the
court held the transaction met the profit test of section 183 and also
found the transaction was not a sham. 130
As noted above, in Rice's Toyota World and many other saleleaseback cases, the Tax Court has analyzed business purpose in de-

124.

88 T.C. at 727.

125.

Id. at 734. Compare this aspect of Torres with Mukerji v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 926,

968 n.34 (1986) (court simply stated that there was a business purpose and that the taxpayers

were acting as "prudent businessmen" who scrutinized their investments carefully); with Estate
of Thomas v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 412, 433, 438, 440 n.52 (1985) (court stated that the record
showed there was reasonable potential for profit and hence the taxpayer had the objective of

making a profit, and court only required more than de minimis potential profits to find that tax
avoidance was not the sole motive). See also Levy v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. No. 54 (Nov. 2,

1988) (requiring that there be "an actual and honest profit objective for entering the activity"
in order to satisfy § 183).
126.
127.

11 Cl. Ct. 17 (1986).
Id. at 26.

128. Id. at 28.
129.
130.

Id.
Id. at 37.
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termining whether the transaction was a sham. 13 1 The analysis, however, should focus on the substance of the transaction and bypass the
search for a business purpose. In evaluating the substance of the
transaction, the courts necessarily will determine whether a sale has
in fact occurred, i.e., whether the seller has transferred the benefits
and burdens of ownership in light of the whole transaction including
the leaseback. If the substance of the transaction test is satisfied, i.e.,
if the arrangement possesses the required level of economic substance, 1 then courts properly can consider, as a separate matter,
whether the taxpayer has fulfilled the requirements of section 183.
At that point, the courts should evaluate the statutory standard intended by Congress in section 183. That standard permits only limited
deductions when an activity lacks profit motive. It is only at that
point that Congress has clearly spoken, having explicitly chosen to
require that the taxpayer have a motive to earn profit in order to
claim full deductions. The business purpose inquiry is therefore appropriate in analyzing section 183, but unnecessary and inappropriate in
sham transaction analysis. 1 This approach is consistent with that
advocated by Professor Warren, who rejected a judicial requirement
of a pre-tax profit where Congress has enacted tax preferences.,-,
Courts obviously must undertake an analysis of profits or profit motives where Congress has required.
B.

Sales and Ownership Situations

In a number of cases, courts have had to decide whether a transaction framed as a sale should be respected for tax purposes. In many
of these cases, courts have used some form of the sham transaction
doctrine. In others, the courts have focused primarily on the substance
of the transaction and determined whether the incidents of ownership
had passed. In this area, the sham transaction doctrine is a useless
appendage to the determinative analysis of whether the attributes of
ownership have transferred to the buyer. Thus, analysis should focus
on the substance of the transaction, particularly on the question of
whether the seller has transferred the incidents or attributes of ownership to the buyer.
131.
132.

See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
Cf. Steele, Sham in Substance: The Tax Court's Emerging Standard for Testing

Sale-Leasebacks, 14 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 3 (1986) (describing factors important in determining
substance of a sale-leaseback transaction).
133. Section 183(c) defines "activity not engaged in for profit" as activities other than those
with respect to which deductions are allowed under §§ 162 or 212. However, the Regulations
under § 183 establish with some precision a definition, identifying nine relevant factors. Treas.
Reg. § 1.183-2. The Regulations purport to be utilizing an objective standard.
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Recent Tax Court decisions adopt a two-step approach for analyzing
sales transactions, first determining whether a sale of property has
occurred and then determining whether the court should disregard
the transaction for tax purposes because it lacks substance. Illustrative
of this approach is Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner,1
involving taxpayers who purported to purchase units of cattle, at
$30,000 per unit, each consisting of five breeding cows. The taxpayers
paid a small down payment (no more than $1,500) per unit, with the
remainder of the purchase price payable through a nonrecourse promissory note. The seller retained and managed the herd and received
a management fee. Moreover, the seller was to retain the bulk of the
proceeds of the business as either payment of outstanding interest
and principal on the notes or as management fees. After evaluating
these and other aspects of the transaction, the Tax Court concluded
that it was not a sale and lacked economic substance apart from desired
tax benefits. 13 Hence, the court disregarded the taxpayers' characterization of the arrangement as a sale and held the transaction taxable
in accordance with its substance, not its form.
In Grodt & McKay, the Tax Court framed the critical inquiry in
determining a sale as depending on whether the benefits and burdens
of ownership had passed from the seller to the purchaser. 137 The court
derived from other precedents eight key factors to determine whether
a sale had occurred:
(1) Whether legal title passes; (2) how the parties treat
the transaction; (3) whether an equity was acquired in the
property; (4) whether the contract creates a present obligation on the seller to execute and deliver a deed and a present
obligation on the purchaser to make payments; (5) whether
the right of possession is vested in the purchaser; (6) which
party pays the property taxes; (7) which party bears the
risk of loss or damage to the property; and (8) which party
receives the profits from the operation and sale of the prop1
erty. 8
Using these standards to evaluate the evidence in the case, the Tax
Court concluded that the transaction was not a sale.139 Critical factors

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See Warren, supra note 10, at 989-90.
77 T.C. 1221 (1981).
Id. at 1245-46.
Id. at 1237.
Id. at 1237-38 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1245.
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were the gross excess of the purchase price over the fair market value
of the cattle (purchase price was ten times market value), the absence
of any right to possess or control the cattle, the absence of any risks
of ownership on the part of the purchasers, and the allocation of the
overwhelming majority of the profits to the sellers.140 Thus, the Tax
Court refused to consider the transaction a sale for tax purposes.
The Tax Court in Grodt & McKay did not accept the Commissioner's argument that any purported sale transaction which was found
not to be a sale was necessarily a sham. Rather, the court decided
completely to disregard this transaction for tax purposes because it
failed to have "any economic, commercial, or legal purpose" beyond
tax consequences.141 Because there was no realistic possibility of
economic profit except for tax benefits, the court found no business
substance to the transaction and disregarded it for purposes of taxation.'4 Although the court used the word "sham" occasionally, 43 the
essence of the decision was to focus on the substance of the transaction.
The approach of the Tax Court in Grodt & McKay thus involved
a determination of whether the transaction was a sale, and then whether
any substance to the transaction existed apart from tax benefits. One
troubling aspect of the decision is that it is not entirely clear where
the court would draw the line between those transactions which should
be disregarded completely for tax purposes and those which should
be respected. Indeed, the court itself refused to attempt to draw such
a line.1M Another troubling aspect was the court's merging of analysis
of the substance of the transaction with constant reference to the
taxpayer's purpose, as if the two ideas were synonymous. Apparently,
the lack of economic substance combined with the presence of desired
tax consequences led the court to the conclusion to disregard the
transaction for tax purposes.
The Tax Court followed the same basic approach in Falsetti v.
Commissioner, where it concluded that sales of real estate were
"shams in substance. ' ' 145 The court defined shams in substance by
reference to Knetsch and Frank Lyon as "the expedient of drawing
up papers to characterize transactions contrary to objective economic

140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 1238-43.
Id. at 1243, relying on Knetsch, Gregory and Estate of Franklin.
Id. at 1244-46.
The court used the word "sham" or synonyms such as "facade" several times. See,

e.g., id. at 1221 (describing the issue); id. at 1243 (stating that the finding of no true sales did
not necessarily mean that the transaction was a sham); id. at 1241 (transaction a mere facade).
144. Id. at 1244.
145. 85 T.C. 332, 347 (1985), discussed supra in text at notes 57-62.
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realities and which have no economic significance beyond expected tax
benefits. 146 After defining sham in substance, the Tax Court applied
Grodt & McKay and concluded that the seller had not transferred the
burdens and benefits of ownership to the buyer. Therefore, the transaction did not rise to the level of a sale.' 7 Again, following the pattern
of Grodt & McKay, the Tax Court analyzed the transaction to determine whether any economic, commercial, or legal purpose existed
apart from tax consequences. 14 In substance, the transaction was a
loan rather than a purchase of an ownership interest in the property.
Thus, the court concluded that the transaction was a sham in substance. The court determined that the taxpayers had "engaged in the
expedient of drawing up papers to characterize the transactions in
question as something contrary to the economic realities thereof, solely
'4 9
to obtain unallowable tax benefits.'
The bifurcated analysis in Grodt & McKay and Falsettiis confusing
and unnecessary. The concept of sham or sham in substance adds
nothing of significance to the court's analysis. Moreover, a phrase such
as sham in substance is counterproductive to the extent that it encourages simply labeling. The proper analysis requires a determination of
the substance of the transaction. 1' Using factors such as those mentioned in Grodt & McKay for ascertaining whether a sale occurred,
the court should evaluate the transaction to determine whether in fact
the burdens and benefits of ownership were transferred.
In Milbrew v. Commissioner, the Seventh Circuit analyzed a sale
transaction and found that the sale of a manufacturing plant was a
sham and hence should be disregarded. 151 Looking at a series of factors,

146. Id.
147. Id. at 355. Critical factors in Falsetti were the failure of legal title to vest with the
purchaser, the absence of an ar's-length transaction, the disproportionately high purchase
price compared to the fair market value, and the behavior of the parties inconsistent with the
purchaser's ownership. Id. at 349-51. Other factors included that the sellers continued to use
the property as security; that subsequent sales ignored the taxpayer purchaser's interest; and
that the parties disregarded the terms of the contract. Id. at 351-54.
148. Id. at 354 (citing Grodt & McKay, 77 T.C. at 1243). Since the taxpayers had not
investigated their investment, had not protected their investment once made, had not controlled
the property, and had not protected their interest upon its disposition, there was a failure of
the "requisite minimum business purpose." Id. at 354.
149. Id. at 355. Falsettihas been followed by the Tax Court in other sales situations. See,
e.g., Helba v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 983 (1986) (applying the sham in substance test, looking
at both the substance of the transaction and the business purpose in a case involving a purchase
of videotape productions).
150. See Gideon, supra note 10, at 842-43 (urging that the key is the determination of
ownership).
151. 710 F.2d 1302, 1307 (7th Cir. 1983).
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the court concluded that "[t]he unrealistic price in the contract, together with the payment terms and history, the family relationship,
the presence of a strong tax-avoidance motive, and the informality of
the arrangement152 warranted the conclusion that the sale was a sham
transaction. While Judge Posner mentioned the taxpayer's tax avoidance motive, his opinion otherwise supports a substance of the transaction test as proposed in this article. Under the proposed test, the
court should respect a sale type of transaction for tax purposes if and
only if the substance of the transaction reflects the transfer of the
incidents of ownership to the purchaser. It does not enhance the
analysis to call the transaction a "sham" or a "phony."'1
Another example of the emphasis on the substance of a transaction
while reaching a conclusion that the transaction was a sham is
Thompson v. Commissioner.'- In that case, the Ninth Circuit upheld
the Tax Court determination that the real property sold was disproportionately overpriced and that the sale was a sham. 155 An additional
factor the court relied on was the option of the seller to repurchase
the land for a substantially lower price than that at which it was sold
to the purchaser. The Ninth Circuit noted the transaction was probably
artificially arranged to create tax benefits. However, that determination was not necessary to sustain the Tax Court's decision. The key
to the decision appears to be the artificially high price at which the
seller sold the property. At bottom, this constituted the basis for
disregarding the transaction. Under the approach proposed in this
article, the court should analyze the substance of the transaction.
Certainly a key factor in the analysis is the level of the purchase price
and the method of financing the transaction.
Thus, in evaluating typical cases involving purported sales transactions, courts need not utilize the sham transaction doctrine. The critical
inquiry involves determining the substance of the transaction. Courts
can answer this inquiry by evaluating a series of factors such as those
enumerated in Grodt & McKay for determining whether a sale has
occurred, i.e., whether the benefits and burdens of ownership shifted
to the buyer. In essence, that is a substance of the transaction analysis.
The sham transaction doctrine, interpreted as a substance of the transaction test, is already included in the determination of whether the

152.
153.

Id.
See id. at 1304, 1307.

154. 631 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981).
155. Id. at 646-49.
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transaction is a sale. To the extent that the sham transaction doctrine
involves inquiry into taxpayers' motives, it suffers from the problems
discussed above. 1
C. Interest Deductions
Over the years, numerous courts have discussed the sham transaction doctrine in cases involving claimed interest deductions. These
cases are most appropriately analyzed under the proposed substance
of the transaction test: Has the taxpayer made a genuine payment of
interest on a real debt; is the payment made for the use of money?-57
The application of this test is best understood by exploring several
types of situations involving interest deductions in which courts have
previously invoked the sham transaction doctrine.
One frequent scenario challenged recently under the sham transaction doctrine concerns circular financing schemes, involving circulation
of funds creating formal but artificial interest payments. In a series
of cases, the Ninth Circuit denied interest deductions under the sham
transaction doctrine, using many of the variations of the doctrine described above.
In an early example, United States v. Clardy,'1 the Ninth Circuit
focused on the facade aspects of the transaction, using words such as
pretended, sham, and illusion. The defendant had engineered for other
taxpayers the purported prepayment of substantial amounts of interest
by utilizing a check swapping technique. In reality, the self-cancelling
transactions of loans and payments resulted in the involved parties
ending up in the same position they started from, but for the purported
payment of interest. The court concluded that the taxpayers had no
serious intent to complete any of the transactions. There was no real
money in existence. The court wrote that a "'a loan' was made from the
prepaid interest which it was supposed to enable to be 'paid."' 59 Hence,
no prepaid interest was paid. In Clardy, the court's analysis focused
on the illusory nature of the transaction, and questioned whether any
substance existed behind the forms given to the arrangement.0 Finally, the court drew an analogy to Knetsch, concluding that these

156.

See supra text accompanying notes 93-102.

157. The definition of interest as "compensation for the use or forbearance of money" stems
from Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 498 (1940), and is frequently cited. See, e.g., Knetsch,
452 U.S. at 365; Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 1976).
158. 612 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1980).
159. Id. at 1151.
160. Id. at 1152.
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were paper transactions solely used to create interest deductions with161
out any intent to complete the transactions.
Seven years later, another circular financing scheme was utilized
to create purported interest deductions in United States v. Schulman.162 As in Clardy, the taxpayer undertook check swapping to create
"loans" and corresponding interest payments. In concluding that the
transactions were shams, the Ninth Circuit relied on Commissioner
v. Court Holding Co. 6 3 for the principle that "the true nature of a
transaction may not 'be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist
solely to alter tax liabilities." ' 164 The Ninth Circuit also relied on
Knetsch as establishing the requirement that there be genuine indebtedness. The test, according to the court, was "whether there were
real interest payments on genuine indebtedness.",, The transactions
were void of substance because of the lack of economic risk associated
with the loans.16 The debts did not involve a genuine conveyance of
real money. Hence, the court determined that the transactions were
shams and permitted the case against the taxpayer to go forward.
In a final example from the Ninth Circuit, Bail Bonds By Marvin
Nelson, Inc. v. Commissioner,67 the court defined a sham as a transaction that "has no purpose or economic effect other than the creation
of tax deductions" and stated that the focus should be on the substance
of the transaction. 2 The business purpose portion of the test involved
the subjective issue of the taxpayer's motivation. Economic substance,
on the other hand, involved determination of whether the substance
coincided with the form and whether economic benefits were likely to
result from the transaction. In this case, through fictitious transfers
of money, the taxpayer supposedly borrowed $25,000 from one entity
and purported to pay the principal and interest back with loans from
a related entity. The court concluded that the transaction was a sham
because the taxpayer had no business purpose for the loans, the loan
and repayment were simply circulation of funds through a tax avoidance system, no evidence existed of a legal obligation to repay the

161. Id. at 1153.
162. 817 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 362 (1987).
163. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
164. Schulman, 817 F.2d at 1359 (quoting Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945)).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1359-60. A similar approach focusing on the substance of the transaction is found
in Goldberg v. United States, 789 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1986), where the court upheld a deternination of sham because of the absence of arm's-length transactions and the failure of the taxpayer
to show "any actual economic liabilities of any substance." Id. at 1343.
167. 820 F.2d 1543 (9th Cir. 1987).
168. Id. at 1548.
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loan except at best a purely formal obligation, and no evidence was
demonstrated that the loans could have benefited the taxpayer econom-

ically.

169

The courts should analyze all of these cases in a straightforward
manner under the substance of the transaction test. The taxpayers
had no real obligation to repay an actual indebtedness, hence there
was no payment of interest for the use or forbearance of money. The
key, then, is to identify whether the transaction complies with the
statutory language requiring (1) interest, (2) paid or accrued on, (3)
indebtedness.170 The courts should determine these component factors
by analyzing the economic substance of the transaction, without considering the investment's business purpose. 17' The courts would not
need to conduct a business purpose analysis. In some ways, Knetsch
is an example of this scenario, for it involved a circular scheme of
borrowing, payment of interest on the loan, and rebates of interest
through the loan back of money (the excess of cash value over the
amount of debt).' *' Looking at the substance of the transaction from
that perspective, the rebates of interest offset the obligation to pay
corresponding amounts of interest. Characterization of the remaining
interest as a fee for the tax deduction is not unreasonable. 73 Another
example is Salley v. Commissioner,"74 in which the taxpayer borrowed
substantial amounts from an insurance company, paying interest on
the loans. Concomitantly, the taxpayer received substantial amounts
as nontaxable insurance dividends resulting in a net, out-of-pocket
expenditure of $7,000 and interest deductions of $50,000. Relying on
Knetsch, the Fifth Circuit found no economic substance to the transaction, no payment for the use or forbearance of money, and no business purpose. 17 The business purpose aspect is irrelevant under the
proposed analysis. The court would reach the same result by simply
analyzing the substance of the transaction. 76
Application of the substance of the transaction test in place of the
sham transaction doctrine would not produce startling results in this

169. Id. at 1550.
170. I.R.C. § 163(a) (1986).
171. See generally Asimow, supra note 24 (providing economic analysis of what is interest
and what is indebtedness and describing and criticizing cases).
172. Knetsck, 364 U.S. at 366.
173. Id.
174. 464 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1972).

175. Id. at 482-85.
176. The court in Salley also relied on the Second Circuit opinion in Goldstein, discussed
infra at notes 181-89, stating that where there is no business purpose and no economic substance

the transaction need not be given effect for tax purposes.
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context. Indeed, it is an approach several courts have long favored,
most notably the Second Circuit in Lynch v. Commissioner.fl In that
case, Judge Friendly eschewed looking at the taxpayer's purpose but
instead evaluated the substance of the entire transactions, the "objective realities. 178 These "realities" indicated that the elaborate forms
which the taxpayer utilized did not result in legal transactions involving the use or forbearance of money, and hence the claimed interest
deduction was disallowed. 179
A second scenario involving challenges to interest deductions derives from taxpayers borrowing at interest rates higher than the income generated by their investment of borrowed funds. Of course,
the factors in Knetsch itself involved this type of situation: Knetsch
borrowed at 3 1/2 percent in order to purchase annuity bonds yielding
2 1/2 percent interest. 18° Another illustration of the problems posed
in analyzing this type of transaction is found in the 1966 Second Circuit
decision in Goldstein v. Commissioner.181 In this case, made famous
by its inclusion in basic federal tax casebooks,"1 Tillie Goldstein won
the Irish Sweepstakes resulting in a substantial increase in her income.
She borrowed significant amounts from a bank and used the funds to
purchase U.S. Treasury notes, which she pledged as collateral to secure the loan. Goldstein prepaid interest on the loan and claimed the
expense as an interest deduction in the year the Sweepstakes proceeds
were declared as income. The interest which the taxpayer paid on the
loans (4 percent) was substantially higher than what she earned on
the government obligations (1 1/2 percent).'8
The Second Circuit held that the transactions were not shams,
relying on four factors. First, the banks involved were independent
financial institutions. Second, the loans did not return the parties to
their starting points within a few days. Third, the independent financial institutions had significant control over the future of the loan
arrangements. Fourth, the notes were recourse notes. Hence, the

177.

273 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1959).

178. Id. at 872.
179. Id. at 871-72; see also Goodstein v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959) (concluding that the substance of the transaction was neither borrowing of funds nor the payment
of interest); Karme v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1163 (1980) (applying substance of the transaction
test and concluding loan transaction was a sham), affd, 673 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1982).
180. 365 U.S. at 362-63.
181. 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967).
182. See, e.g., W. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 461 (3d ed. 1985).
183. 364 F.2d at 739.
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Second Circuit concluded that the transactions
were not shams and
1T
did not fail to create genuine indebtedness.
Despite finding that the transactions were not shams, the Second
Circuit nonetheless refused to allow an interest deduction on the loan'
The evidence demonstrated that the taxpayer would suffer an economic
loss on the transaction given the excess of the interest rates paid on
the loan over those earned on the purchased Treasury obligations.
The court discounted the taxpayer's explanation that the transaction
might produce a profit if the market for Treasury obligations rose.
Thus, the court concluded that the taxpayer entered the transactions
"without any realistic expectation of economic profit and 'solely' in
order to secure a large interest deduction in 1958 which could be
deducted from her sweepstakes winnings in that year."' Hence, the
court concluded that section 163(a) did not permit an interest deduction
where the transactions "can not with reason be said to have purpose,
substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences."",
The Second Circuit attempted to coordinate the broad scope of
section 163 and the question of motive addressed in Gregory v. Helvering. The court admitted that the congressional purpose behind section
163 was broad, but the court believed that limits were inherent in
Congress' decision to encourage purposive activity financed through
borrowing. The court wrote that
Section 163(a) should be construed to permit the deductibility
of interest when a taxpayer has borrowed funds and incurred
an obligation to pay interest in order to engage in what with
reason can be termed purposive activity, even though he
decided to borrow in order to gain an interest deduction
rather than to finance the activity in some other way. In
other words, the interest deduction should be permitted
whenever it can be said that the taxpayer's desire to secure
an interest deduction is only one of mixed motives that
prompts the taxpayer to borrow funds; or, put a third way,
the deduction is proper if there is some substance to the
loan arrangement beyond the taxpayer's desire to secure the
deduction. 8
184. Id. at 737-38. The court distinguished here Lynch, discussed in text accompanying
supra notes 177-79, -and Goodstein, discussed supra note 179, as cases were the 'sham' and
'absence of indebtedness' rationales" are best reserved, because of the absence of most of these
four factors. 364 F.2d at 738.
185. 364 F.2d at 742.
186. Id. at 740.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 741.
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While struggling with the language in Gregory that a taxpayer has
the right to try to decrease his taxes lawfully, the court was reluctant
to permit the deduction when the transaction had no substance or
purpose aside from a tax benefit. Otherwise, investors would undertake transactions with no economic utility. Thus, the court concluded
that when the arrangement possessed no substance, utility, or purpose
beyond the tax deduction, there should be no deduction. The court
carefully distinguished this ground from a finding of a sham transaction.
The best way to accommodate these concerns in the case of interest
deductions is to evaluate the substance of the transaction and determine what kind of arrangement really is involved. This analysis becomes particularly difficult in cases such as Goldstein because of two
different views of substance. With respect to the simple borrowing of
money, where there is a real obligation to pay interest, the substance
over form test would suggest that the interest deduction is proper.
The form of the transaction corresponds to a genuine obligation to
pay the principal and to compensate the lender for the use of that
principal, i.e., interest. Even here, however, the Internal Revenue
Service could argue that the payments are not, in fact, interest as
that term is understood. 1 9 On the other hand, when one analyzes the
economic substance of the whole transaction, the taxpayer is borrowing
at 4 percent and earning interest at 1 1/2 percent, a transaction which
lacks any likelihood of economic benefit. This analysis suggests that
when, as here, no economic benefit accompanies the transaction when
viewed as a whole, the taxpayer should receive no tax relief. Thus,
despite the fact that the taxpayer genuinely incurs an obligation to
pay interest, the whole transaction lacks economic substance.
This conclusion requires a choice of whether to evaluate the transaction step by step, or to compress the transaction and consider it in
its entirety. This decision opens the debate inherent in the application
of the step transaction doctrine, another doctrine used to combat tax
avoidance. The traditional situations in which courts have invoked the
step transaction doctrine are: 1) where the taxpayer intends to reach
a particular result at the end of a series of steps, 2) where the taxpayer
engages in steps which are so interdependent that the separate steps
would be fruitless if not accompanied by the others, and 3) where the
taxpayer has made a binding commitment to take subsequent steps

189. See Gunn, supranote 7, at 753 (arguing Goldstein's payment was not interest because
the payment was not for the use of money, analogizing to Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner,
544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976), and Lynch v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1959)).
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after taking the first step. 190 The step transaction doctrine retains the
possibility of using state of mind considerations in determining when
to view separate steps as an integrated whole. 191 Again, it appears
that the central analysis should inquire into the substance of the transaction looking at its entirety. 1' Thus, in the Goldstein situation, combining an inquiry into the substance of the entire transaction with the
step transaction doctrine would lead the court to deny the deduction. 93
Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner'- typifies another situation
involving interest where courts successfully have applied the substance
of the transaction test. In that case, the Ninth Circuit denied an
interest deduction on the ground that where the transaction involved
nonrecourse debt, and where the taxpayer did not show that the
purchase price of the property approximated fair market value, the
purchaser-borrower had not secured the use or forbearance of
money. 95 In the court's view, the nonrecourse debt would have
economic significance only if the property substantially appreciated in
value. This result was necessary to make the debt bona fide and
capable of justifying an interest deduction. In other words, the court
believed that a real debt with legitimate interest expense would exist
only when it was economically reasonable for the taxpayer to invest
in the amount of the unpaid purchase price. Although the Commissioner argued that the transaction was a sham, and the Tax Court
held that the transaction was the purchase of an option to acquire
property, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the substance did not
mesh with the form of the transaction when the purchase price exceeded fair market value. With respect to the interest deduction, the
nonrecourse nature of the loan coupled with the purchase price in
excess of fair market value meant that "the transaction in economic
terms [was] a mere chance that a genuine debt obligation may arise."'

190. See Chirelstein & Lopata, Recent Developments in the Step-TransactionDoctrine, 60
TAXES 970 (1982) (describing the three major variations of the step-transaction doctrine, known

as the end result test, the mutual interdependence test, and the binding commitment test).
191.

Blum, supra note 93, at 529-36.

192. See supra notes 93-102. According to Rice, supra note 3, at 1046-47, with respect to
the step-transaction doctrine, "prediction is difficult to the point of impossibility, .. " and he
urged evaluation of objective evidence.
193. This approach advocated here differs substantially from that recommended by Asimow,
supra note 24, at 791-93, who embraced the implication of a requirement of motive in § 163.
Recognizing that motive is difficult to prove and that it must be determined on the basis of
what actually happened, he wondered whether there were any real differences.
194. 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976).
195. Id. at 1049.
196. Id.
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Thus, although ultimately not a sham transaction case, Estate of
Franklinillustrates how courts can answer a common question of the
propriety of interest deductions satisfactorily by using the substance
of the transaction analysis. 19
Significant congressional action makes the analysis of interest deductions substantially easier today. Congress has reacted to efforts of
taxpayers as described above by limiting deductibility of investment
interest' 98 and interest on debt incurred to purchase or carry tax exempt obligations. 1' These statutory provisions will reduce the need
to use judicial doctrines to combat tax avoidance involving interest.
Moreover, tax avoidance potential is diminished after the 1986 Tax
Reform Act through the denial of personal interest deductions. 20°
D.

Application to Trusts and Gift-Leasebacks

A number of recent cases have disregarded family trust or other
similar arrangements on the grounds that they were shams. These
cases have applied a variety of theories to conclude almost uniformly
to disregard the transactions for tax purposes. In the context of trusts
and gift-leasebacks, it is again appropriate to conclude that the courts'
use of the sham transaction doctrine is unnecessary and possibly misleading. Particularly in the trust area, courts successfully can analyze
the underlying situation through the use of the substance of the transaction doctrine and other judicial doctrines and statutory limitations
already in place.
In evaluating trust arrangements, numerous courts have used multiple theories, including the sham transaction doctrine, in disregarding
particular transactions for tax purposes. An illustrative case is Neely
v. United States.20 1 The Ninth Circuit found a sham transaction when
the taxpayers transferred title to certain family assets to a family

197. Compare id. at 1045 with Karme v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1163 (1980), affd, 673
F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1982) (utilizing substance of the transaction test and Estate of Franklin
criteria to conclude loan transaction was a sham where there was great discrepancy between
purported indebtedness and fair market value of asset, where taxpayer failed to investigate

purchase, where circular transactions were involved, and where inconsistencies were found in
documents). See Asimow, supra note 24, at 790-91 (arguing that Estate of Franklin will be

"difficult to administer" but is theoretically sound).
198. I.R.C. § 163(d) (limiting deduction for investment interest to net investment income).
199. I.R.C. § 265(a)(2) (1986) (denying deduction for interest on indebtedness incurred or
continued to purchase or carry tax exempt obligations).
200. I.R.C. § 163(h) (disaliowing personal interest deduction except for qualified residence

interest).
201.

775 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1985).
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trust. The taxpayers nonetheless retained the use and enjoyment of
the assets, and sought deductions for expenses connected to the creation and management of the trust. The court defined a sham transaction as one without economic effect apart from the creation of income
tax consequences. 2 2 Although the court adopted a substance over form
analysis, it also stated that it would disregard a transaction if the
taxpayer's sole purpose was tax avoidance. This analysis embraces a
business purpose doctrine as well as an economic substance approach.
In addition to concluding that the transaction was a sham, the court
determined that the grantor trust provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code were not satisfied because of the substantial control that the
grantor (taxpayer) retained. This finding would also require taxing
the grantor. Hence, the court set forth a series of factors as the
rationale for affirming the district court's decision to disallow the deductions.
Another illustration of the use of multiple theories culminating in
the finding of a sham transaction is the Eighth Circuit's decision in
the family trust case F.P.P. Enterprises v. United States.2°3 Here,
the court focused primarily on the question of economic substance.
The court concluded that the trusts were shams without economic
substance because the taxpayers continued to exercise control over
assets which they had purported to transfer in trust;2 In addition,
the court stated that the continued control demonstrated that the
transfers to the trusts violated state law defining fraudulent conveyances. The state's law did require an intent to defraud, which the
court found from evidence that the taxpayer transferred assets to the
°
trusts to shelter his assets from potential creditors and claimants.2
Finally, the court concluded that the trusts were simply the alter egos
of the taxpayers and were not entitled to separate tax treatment.
Again, the court utilized a variety of theories in reaching the conclusion
that the transaction was a sham.
202. Id. at 1094.
203. 830 F.2d 114 (8th Cir. 1987).
204. Id. at 118. The taxpayer transferred to a trust created by another person all of his
properties in exchange for shares of the trust. The taxpayer continued to live in and use the

properties and to pay the expenses. The government sought to levy on certain of the property
conveyed to the trust to satisfy the taxpayer's tax liability.
205. Id.; see also Carr Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 698 F.2d 952 (8th Cir. 1983)
(finding transfer to trust both a sham transaction and a fraudulent conveyance under state law).
These cases raise the problem of linkage between state law and federal tax law. Courts should
be vary of connecting the two areas unless Congress has clearly spoken or has clearly left an
area to be governed by state law. Cf. Boyter v. Commissioner, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981)
(considering sham transaction doctrine in the context of divorce, a matter normally governed

under state law).
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Several of the recent family trust cases have also utilized the assignment of income doctrine from Lucas v. Earl,2 6 as well as the sham
transaction doctrine, to disregard the form of a trust. For example,
the Tenth Circuit in Holmanv. United States27 applied the assignment
of income doctrine, the grantor trust provisions, and the sham transaction doctrine in reaching the conclusion that the trust was a sham
which should be disregarded. Applying Lucas v. Earl, the Tenth Circuit found that the taxpayer's trust was a "transparent attempt" to
assign the income of the doctor-settlor, because the trust did not
supervise the doctor's employment, the trust did not determine his
compensation, and the doctor had no obligations to perform for the
trust. 2°8 With respect to the grantor trust provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code, the court found that the taxpayer violated aspects of
sections 671-79 in that he could exercise power over the trust without
consent of an adverse party. 2°9 This failure to satisfy the judicial assignment of income doctrine and the statutory grantor trust provisions
led the Holman court to conclude that the transaction was a sham.
The court observed both that the transaction was simply designed for
tax avoidance purposes and that the transaction lacked any economic
substance, the two aspects of Rice's Toyota World test for a sham
transaction. Thus, Holman illustrates the approach of numerous courts
using a substantial number of the vast array of weapons to disqualify
a transaction.210
The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Buttorofftll followed a similar
approach, holding a trust invalid because it was fraudulent, violated
the assignment of income doctrine, violated the statutory grantor trust
requirements, and was a sham. Sham was defined as "wholly lacking
in any real substance. '' 212 However, the court engaged in no significant
independent analysis of the sham nature of the transaction. Although
the court used the test for a sham transaction advocated in this article,

206. 281 U.S. 111 (1930). The Supreme Court established that income should be taxed to
the person earning it, and that anticipatory assignments of income were ineffective to transfer
tax liability. Id. at 112. The role of the assignment of income doctrine as a means of reducing
improper tax avoidance is discussed in Gunn, supra note 7, at 758-65.
207. 728 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1984).
208. Id. at 464.
209. Id. at 464-65.
210. See also Hanson v. Commissioner, 696 F.2d 1232 (9th Cir. 1983) (refusing to give tax

effect to a family trust which was an anticipatory assignment of income, which had no economic
substance, and which did not conform to the grantor trust provisions). Knetsch was cited as
support for the conclusion to disregard the transaction. Id. at 1234.
211. 761 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1985).
212. Id. at 1062.
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i.e., the test of economic substance, there seems to be little need for
or
the sham transaction doctrine in this context when other doctrines
213
approaches are more precisely tailored to analyze the problem.
Zmuda v. Commissioner illustrates the convergence of the various
theories in the trust area.214 The Ninth Circuit concluded in Zmuda

that "[t]here is no real difference between the business purpose and
the economic substance rules; both simply state that the Commissioner
may look beyond the form of a transaction to discover its substance. '' 215
The court observed that the judiciary generally invokes the business
purpose rule to determine the validity of the formation of an entity.
In contrast, courts apply the economic substance rule more often in
the context of particular transactions. However, courts have applied
the economic substance rule in the context of business purpose determinations and vice versa. Thus, because the business purpose and
economic substance rules have the same rationale, both emphasizing
substance over form, the court concluded that the trusts were shams
under either test. 216 The critical factors noted were the complete con-

trol retained by the settlors and the trusts' complete absence of business activity.217

The gift-leaseback situation is closely related to the trust area, and
the sham transaction analysis is equally unnecessary in this context.
In the typical gift-leaseback situation, a donor gives property to a
trust established for his children and then leases the property back
for use in his business. The donor seeks to take rental deductions under
section 162(a)(3)218 and to have the children report the rental income

213. Examples of this approach abound. See also United States v. Krall, 835 F.2d 711 (8th
Cir. 1987) (finding a sham on grounds of the taxpayer's exercise of control and by examination
of the true nature of the transaction); United States v. Smith, 657 F. Supp. 646 (W.D. La.
1986) (finding a sham after looking at the substance of the transaction, finding that the only
economic effect was to create deductions, but also stating that there must be a legitimate
business purpose for the conveyance and leaseback of property).
214. 731 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1984).
215. Id. at 1420.
216. Id. at 1423.
217. Id. at 1421. The essential facts in Zmuda involved the transfer by the Zmudas of
income producing property to a foreign trust, which distributed income to another foreign trust,
which loaned money to the Zmudas in exchange for promissory notes, which were then delivered
as gifts to the Zmudas. Id. at 1419.
218. I.R.C. § 162(a)(3) (1986) allows a deduction for "rentals or other payments required
to be made as a condition to the continued use or possession, for the purposes of the trade or
business, of property to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he
has no equity."
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at their lower bracket rate. 21 9 The Commissioner has attacked this

gift-leaseback approach as a sham transaction because the arrangement
merely involves a taxpayer creating a rental obligation in order to
reduce his taxes. 0 The Commissioner has urged that a business purpose must exist for the entire gift-leaseback transaction, not just for
the leaseback itself.Y'
Courts evaluating gift-leaseback transactions have also taken a
variety of approaches. One view, endorsed by the Fourth Circuit in
Perry v. United States- and the Fifth Circuit in Van Zandt v. Commissioner,m required a business purpose for the entire transaction,
i.e., for the gift and the leaseback. These opinions embraced the view
that "a multistep transaction [should be judged] by its overall effect
and not simply by scrutiny of mutually dependent steps,"' and that
deductibility under section 162 requires that the whole transaction
have a business purpose.m This analysis would, of course, invalidate
most gift-leasebacks because a business purpose rarely accompanies
the original gift; it usually is undertaken to minimize taxes by division
of income among family members. Moreover, to consider providing
for one's children's well-being as a business purpose would render the
business purpose requirement meaningless .2 6 Interestingly, the Fifth

Circuit subsequently embraced a substance over form analysis in
Mathews v. United States and disregarded a gift-leaseback arrange-

219. The "kiddie tax," enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, eliminates the benefits of
this approach for children under age 14, since they are taxed at their parents' marginal rate.
I.R.C. § 1(i) (1986).
220. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 1277, 1280 (2d Cir. 1983) (upholding
gift-leaseback since trustees were independent and taxpayer's control was not substantially the
same under trust).
221. See, e.g., id. at 1281; Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269, 272 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (and cases cited therein).
222. 520 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976).
223. 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965).
224. Perry, 520 F.2d at 238.
225. Id. at 288-39; Van Zandt, 341 F.2d at 443-44. Van Zandt noted that "factors such as
the short term of the trust, reversion to the settlors, predetermination of the right to possession
of the property, and the like, while perfectly permissible so far as taxability of the trust and
the settlors goes, bear heavily on the element of business purpose." Id. at 444. Hence the court
denied a rental deduction.
226. See also Peroni, Untangling the Web of Gift-Leaseback Jurisprudence, 68 MINN. L.
REV. 735, 762-63 (1984) (arguing donor's purpose in gift-leaseback is consistent with Congress'
intent in enacting grantor trust provisions and that meaning of gift is incompatible with business
purpose concept).
227. 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976).
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ment because the taxpayer was in the same position both before and
after the creation of the trust. The taxpayer retained complete control
over the property at all times so the transaction was devoid of economic
reality.22
On the other hand, a number of appellate courts have endorsed
the Tax Court's approach of evaluating four factors. Pursuant to this
approach, the courts permit a rental deduction if: 1) the grantor did
not retain substantially the same control over the property, 2) the
leaseback was in writing and required reasonable rent to be paid, 3)
the leaseback had a bona fide business purpose, and 4) the grantor
did not have a disqualifying equity in the property. 229 Illustrative of
this approach is Rosenfeld v. Commissioner2 in which the Second
Circuit concluded that a gift-leaseback was not a sham. After describing the Tax Court's four-factor test, the Second Circuit focused on
the business purpose issue. The court noted that Congress had
explicitly addressed the question of short term trusts in the Clifford
trust provisions of sections 671-78. Thus, the court determined that
the Commissioner's argument requiring a business purpose for the
gift as well as the leaseback ignored the policy determination that
Congress had made concerning the shifting of income. 231 Trusts complying with the statutory grantor trust provisions were valid trusts,
and thus the Second Circuit refused to adopt the Commissioner's business purpose standard as an additional gloss on gift-leasebacks. 2
Instead of a business purpose test for the entire transaction, the
Second Circuit embraced in effect a substance of the transaction test.
Specifically, the court wrote that "our inquiry should focus on whether
there has been a change in the economic interests of the relevant
parties. If their legal rights and beneficial interests have changed, there
is no basis for labeling a transaction a 'sham' and ignoring it for tax
purposes." Because a real change in the legal rights and economic

228. Id. at 325. Although Mathews utilizes the economic reality test and Van Zandt uses
the business purpose test, in some ways it is difficult to say that Mathews is a departure from
Van Zandt because the former refers frequently to the latter as precedent.
229. See, e.g., the Tax Court opinions in May v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 7, 13 (1981), affd,
723 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1984); Mathews v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 12, 18-19 (1973), rev'd, 520
F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976).
230. 706 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1983).
231. Id. at 1281-82.
232. Id. at 1282-83. The court cited in support numerous commentators. See id. at 1282
n.5. Other courts take the same view. See, e.g., Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (if requirements of §§ 162(a)(3) and 671-78 are met,
taxpayers are entitled to deductions).
233. Rosenfeld, 706 F.2d at 1282.
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positions of the parties had occurred (e.g., broad powers were given
to independent trustees, a fair rental was required of the donor, and
the donor retained no right in the property), the court concluded that
the transaction was not a sham. Almost in passing, the court also
noted legitimate nontax motives for the gift-leaseback did exist, i.e.,
the financial protection of the children and the need to have a business
office.2 Why the court felt it necessary to mention motive when the
court had earlier noted that Congress legitimated income shifting devices in the Clifford trust context is unclear.2 In light of the court's
holding that the transaction was valid because it substantially changed
the taxpayer's economic and beneficial rights, and because the court
rejected the business purpose requirement for the entire transaction,
this brief reference to motive properly should be ignored.
The Rosenfeld approach is similar to that of a number of other
circuit courts. The courts elaborate additional factors in many of these
opinions to provide guidance for evaluation of whether the taxpayers
have accomplished a change in beneficial interests. For example, in
May v. Commissioner,26 the Ninth Circuit evaluated the sufficiency
of a property transfer in terms of the duration of transfer, the donor's
retained control, the donor's subsequent use of the property for his
own benefit, and the trustee's independence.2 7 When these factors
were satisfied, the transfer was "grounded in professional or economic
reality," 1 and was not a sham. The taxpayer could deduct rental
payments under section 162(a)(3) because the leaseback portion of the
transaction had a business purpose. A focus on the requirements of
section 162(a)(3) is another approach which some courts have endorsed.
This approach goes to the substance of the transaction concept as
measured by particular statutory requirements.29
In conclusion, the sham transaction doctrine is unnecessary in the
trust and gift-leaseback areas. With respect to trusts, numerous statutory provisions narrow the range of maneuverability for taxpayers.
Courts should coordinate judicial doctrines with these statutory formu-

234. Id.
235. Id. at 1281-82.
236. 723 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1984).
237. Id. at 1436. These factors had previously been elaborated in Brooke v. United States,
468 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1972).
238. May, 723 F.2d at 1437.
239. See, e.g. Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269, 272-74 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 996 (1979) (also rejecting the test of a business purpose for the whole transaction and
noting specific congressional action regarding Clifford trusts). See generally Peroni, supra note
226 (analyzing grantor retention of reversionary interest under § 162(a)(3)).
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lations. 10 The judiciary can best accomplish this goal by analyzing the
substance of the transaction. With respect to gift-leasebacks, no specific statutory framework exists.41 However, in light of the parallels
between gift-leasebacks and trusts as devices to transfer wealth or
income, it is also desirable for courts to focus on the substance of the
transaction test in determining whether the transaction will be re42
spected as structured.?

E.

Straddles

Courts have utilized the sham transaction doctrine in a series of
recent cases to deny tax effect to various permutations of straddles.
These cases can be grouped into two categories according to the specific
nature of the sham transaction doctrine applied by the courts.
One approach has focused on the fictitious or fake nature of the
24
transaction. Forseth v. Commissioner,
3 a case concerning multiple
taxpayers engaged in precious metal commodity straddles, typifies
this line of decision. Several courts of appeals affirmed the Tax Court's
determination that the transactions were factual shams involving fictitious activity.2 " In Forseth,the Tax Court focused on the substance of
the transaction and concluded the taxpayers had failed to prove that
real precious metals were involved or that a real market or actual
trading existed. Instead, the Tax Court found that the promoter's role
"was to contrive and/or manipulate an unregulated and unpublished
market in gold and platinum forward contracts so that it would de-

240. Of course, the statutory grantor trust provisions themselves derived from early judicial
decisions. As Fuller has noted, "[t~he development of the Code provisions governing grantor
trusts is the classic example of the evolution of independent, objective criteria of tax law from
broad statements of judicial decisions, to administrative regulation, to codification." Fuller,
supra note 3, at 396. Once Congress has acted, then judicial doctrine should carefully complement
the statutory framework.
241. The legislative context for gift-leasebacks is described in Peroni, supra note 226, at
752-56. He concluded that Congress left to the courts the limitation of abusive gift-leasebacks,
and that courts should be guided by the grantor trust rules.
242. Peroni, supra note 226, at 744. Peroni also argued that the courts have improperly
applied a business purpose analysis and urged that the key test be "what the transaction
accomplished." Id. at 745. Cf. Gunn, supra note 7, at 742-43 n.34 ("Since there is no economic difference between the assignments of income permitted under the grantor trust provisions and
those involved in a transfer and leaseback, the rules the courts devise for the leaseback cases
should parallel those of the grantor trust sections.").
243. 85 T.C. 127 (1985).
244. Forseth v. Commissioner, 845 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1988); Enrici v. Commissioner, 813
F.2d 293, 296 (9th Cir. 1987); Mahoney v. Commissioner, 808 F.2d 1219, 1220 (6th Cir. 1987)
(unpublished opinion); Bramblett v. Commissioner, 810 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1987) (unpublished
opinion); Wooldridge v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 266 (11th Cir. 1986) (without opinion).
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liver ' ' - 5 promised tax losses to the taxpayers, and that the sole purpose
involved was tax avoidance. Indeed, at various times, the Tax Court
expressed the view that the transactions were artificial and unreal.2 6
The courts of appeals in several circuits have affirmed the Tax Court's
reasoning in striking down these transactions as fictitious, unreal, and
artificial. 247 In subsequent cases, the Tax Court referred to Forseth's
factual sham test as involving 'those situations where the taxpayer
'' 8
does not establish the jural relationship he purports to create.

2

Courts have used the sham transaction doctrine in a number of other
cases to disregard arrangements involving straddles because the courts
found that the transactions were fake or fictitious.?49
Glass v. Commissioner ° exemplifies the second approach to the
sham transaction doctrine in relation to straddles, focusing on both
motive and substance. Here, the Tax Court determined that the taxpayers did not enter the transactions primarily for economic profit,
and that the expected economic benefits were slight compared to tax
benefits. 1 The essence of the taxpayers' arrangements was to engage

245. Forseth, 85 T.C. at 165. Factors which led the Tax Court to reach this conclusion
included close correlation between tax benefits and taxpayers' tax needs; accurate predictions
by the promoter of the tax benefits; failure of the promoter to enforce margin requirements to
insure against risks; absence of credible third-party evidence of published prices in the London
market for forward contracts in the metals and closing of taxpayers' accounts at convenient
prices; prescience in an inherently volatile market; unexplained bookkeeping entries without
documentation; lack of documentation of initial market-maker positions; manipulation of trading
records.
246. See, e.g., id. at 156-63.
247. See Forseth, 845 F.2d at 749 ("entire tax straddle arrangement was an artifice, the
essence of which was the sale of bogus tax losses to [taxpayers] for a fee."); Enrci, 813 F.2d
at 296 (upholding Tax Court conclusion that taxpayers were "rigging paper prices, losses, and
gains to effectuate a sale of generated tax losses," and stating that the transactions were
"artificial transactions," not "real transactions"); Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (taxpayers "really
just paid a fee to buy fictitiously generated tax losses" tailored to their precise needs).
248. See, e.g. Glass v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1087, 1176 (1986), affd sub nom. Yosha v.
Commissioner, 861 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1988).
249. See, e.g., Brown v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 968, 1000 (1985) (transactions were not
bona fide but were fake or fictitious), affd sub nom. Sochin v. Commissioner, 843 F.2d 351
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, _
U.S.___, 109 S. Ct. 72 (1988); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.
492, 508 (1984) (no evidence that straddle transactions actually occurred; "a grotesque distortion
of the orthodox commodity straddle"); United States v. Atkins, 661 F. Supp. 491, 496 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (prearranged or bogus transactions in commodities); Price v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 860,
883-84 (1987) (fictitious transactions in securities where no securities existed).
250. 87 T.C. 1087 (1986), affd sub nom. Yosha v. Commissioner, 861 F.2d 494 (7th Cir.
1988). According to the Yosha court, nine other circuits are considering appeals from various
taxpayers in Glass, and 25,000 other straddle cases are in dispute at the administrative and
judicial levels.
251. Glass, 87 T.C. at 1162-63.
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in multiple offsetting positions combining option and futures contracts
in metals. Taxpayers would claim an ordinary loss in the first year
and then report a capital gain on a switch transaction in the second
year. Although the Treasury's interpretation of the applicable Internal
Revenue Code sections technically permitted this activity, 2 the Tax
Court found that looking at the whole commodity straddle scheme,
the transactions were designed simply to achieve tax avoidance.2
Later, the court emphasized that the straddle arrangement was a
mere device used to conceal its real character. The transactions lacked
economic substance, because only a de minimis chance of economic
profit existed, and were, therefore, shams.2- Throughout the opinion,
the Tax Court emphasized that the only reason for the arrangement
was to obtain tax benefits, and that there was neither an objective
nor a realization of actual economic gains.
The court in Glass also discussed some of the relevant legislative
developments concerning straddles. In 1976, Congress had amended
section 1234(b) to provide prospectively that gain or loss from a closing
transaction involving an option should be treated as short-term capital
gain or loss, unless the option was granted in the ordinary course of
the taxpayer's trade or business.2 The Tax Court interpreted this
provision as demonstrating Congress' distaste for tax shelter activity
in which the primary objective is not that of making an economic
profit.2 Subsequent legislation in 198425 and 1986m concerning the
treatment of losses on straddles entered into before 1981, when Congress enacted major legislation in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
19812 9 restricting straddles, limited the deductibility of such losses.

252. The essence of this development is described facilely in Judge Posner's opinion in Yosha:
The Treasury Department had decided that while a loss or gain incurred on the
purchase of an option was capital in nature - the right being a capital asset owned
by the holder - a loss or gain incurred on the sale of an option was not. Why the
seller's gain or loss should be thought different in character from the buyer's beats
us, but there it is, and taxpayers were entitled to take advantage of this curiously
asymmetrical treatment of the different legs of a straddle before Congress eliminated the asymmetry.
861 F.2d at 497 (emphasis original).
253. Glass, 87 T.C. at 1163.
254. Id. at 1176.
255. Pub. L. No. 94455, § 2136(a), 90 Stat. 1929 (1976) (codified at I.R.C. § 1234(b) (1988)).
256. Glass, 87 T.C. at 1154-55, 1162-64.
257. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 108, 98 Stat. 494, 630.
258. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1808(d), 100 Stat. 2817 (1986) (codified
at I.R.C. § 1092, note (1988)).
259. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, 323-34 (1981) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 1092, 1256 (1988))
(hereinafter ERTA].
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However, investors could deduct the losses if they could establish that
they incurred the losses in a trade or business or in a transaction entered into for profit. This language is commensurate with the limitation
on loss deductions in section 165(c).2 60 This legislative action led the

260. Glass, 87 T.C. at 1164-69. The legislative history of § 108 of the Tax Reform Act of
1984 and § 1808(d) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 demonstrates the complex interaction between
courts and Congress in determining exactly what Congress intended. Section 108 allowed the
deduction of losses in certain straddles if part of a 'transaction entered into for profit" and
established a presumption that transactions by commodity dealers or those regularly engaged
in investing in regulated futures contracts would be rebuttably presumed to be in transactions
for profit. Based on legislative history, § 108 was interpreted by some courts as requiring a
lesser test of "entered into for profit" than was required in other contexts, such as § 165(c)(2),
where the courts have demanded that a taxpayer have a primary profit motive for a transaction.
See, e.g., Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 289 n.5 (1938). Thus in Miller v.
Commissioner, 84 T.C. 827 (1985), the Tax Court relied on a passage in H. CoNF. REP. No.
861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 917 (1984), which allowed a loss "if there is a reasonable prospect of
any profit from the transaction" as establishing only a requirement that a taxpayer satisfy an
objective test of a reasonable prospect of profit, rather than the more difficult subjective test
of a showing that the transaction was entered primarily for profit. Miller, 84 T.C. at 839. This
judicial endorsement of a lesser standard led Congress to enact § 1808(d) in the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, permitting the loss to be deductible only if the loss was incurred in a trade or
business or a transaction entered into for profit, and to establish a presumption that only
commodities dealers were engaged in a trade or business. The House Report included the
following passages:
A taxpayer who does not satisfy the indicia of trade or business status, such as
the taxpayer in Miller... , would not be considered in the trade or business of
trading commodities. Further, the presumption would not be available in any cases
where the trades were fictitious, prearranged, or otherwise in violation of the rules
of the exchange in which the dealer is a member ....
Section 108 also restated the general rule that losses from the disposition of a
position in a straddle are only allowable if such position was part of a transaction
entered into for profit. A majority of the United States Tax Court in Miller
interpreted section 108 as providing a new, less stringent profit standard for losses
incurred with respect to pre-1981 commodity straddles. It was not the intent of
Congress in enacting section 108 to change the profit-motive standard of section
165(c)(2) or to enact a new profit motive standard for commodity straddle activities.
This technical correction is necessary to end any additional uncertainty created by
the Miller case.
H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 911 (1985). The Conference Report followed the
House Bill and ended with the intent that pre-ERTA straddle litigation be speedily resolved.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11-845 (1986) ("the conferees clarify their
intent that the Internal Revenue Service bring all outstanding pre-ERTA straddle litigation to
a speedy resolution, so that the large docket of cases on this issue may be cleared, in a manner
consistent with this legislation.").
Miller has since been reversed on appeal by the Tenth Circuit, Miller v. Commissioner, 836
F.2d 1274 (10th Cir. 1988), and abandoned by the Tax Court, Boswell v. Commissioner, 91 T.C.
No. 15 (July 26, 1988). See also Landreth v. Commissioner, 859 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1988)
(reversing several other Ninth Circuit opinions and ultimately holding that "entered into for
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Tax Court to investigate whether a profit objective was involved in
the commodity straddles. The Tax Court concluded, in looking at the
whole commodity straddle scheme, that there was "no perceptible
profit objective."2 61 The Tax Court rejected the thought that formal
compliance with the literal provisions of the Code automatically conferred deductibility. Because the taxpayers had no prospect of profiting
economically from the intentionally realized losses in the first year,
their losses were not within the scope of deductible losses intended
by Congress under sections 165, 1234, and the 1984 and 1986 Tax
Reform Acts. 26 The commodity straddle scheme "lacked economic substance and was a sham."'
In affirming the Tax Court's decision in Glass, the Seventh Circuit
in Yosha v. Commissioner analyzed the economic substance of transactions while paying particular attention to the taxpayer's motives.
Writing for the court, Judge Posner viewed section 165(c)(2) as codifying the economic substance doctrine with respect to loss deductions.
In his view, "[a] transaction not 'entered into for profit' is, at the

profit" language of § 108 should be interpreted identically to same language in § 165(c)(2), thus
permitting deduction of losses from pre-ERTA straddle transactions only if primary motive for
entering transactions was economic profit, in cases governed by § 108).
261. Glass, 87 T.C. at 1175 (emphasis original).
262. Id. at 1173-77.
263. Id. at 1176. In other cases also involving tax years before ERTA applied, the determination of whether a transaction was a sham has been considered separately from the entered
into for profit analysis under the statute. See Brown v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 968, 1000 (1985)
(since straddles were fake and fictitious, there was no need to evaluate § 108 of the Tax Reform
Act of 1984), offd sub nom. Sochin v. Commissioner, 843 F.2d 351, 353-54 n.6 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, _ U.S. __, 109 S.Ct. 72 (1988). Since the Tax Court found that the transaction
was not bona fide, but fictitious, the Ninth Circuit believed that the Tax Court had not needed
to reach the reasonable expectation of profit issue. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the proper standard for the sham transaction doctrine was to evaluate economic substance
and business purpose, Sochin, 843 F.2d at 355-56. Concurring, Judge Beezer stated that a
finding of fictitious transactions meant that no inquiry into profit motive was necessary. Sochin,
843 F.2d at 355-56. See also Perlin v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 388, 419 (1986) (first finding the
transactions were bona fide and not fictitious, then determining that the transactions satisfied
the entered into for profit standard of § 108 of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 and therefore the
losses were allowable); Fox v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 1001, 1023 27 (1984) (holding straddle
transaction was not entered primarily for profit and hence no deduction was allowed under §
165(c)(2); court did not address sham transaction argument); Smith v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.
350, 390-94 (1982) (taxpayer in straddle transaction lacked economic profit objective necessary
for deduction under § 165(c)(2)), affid, 820 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir. 1987) (unpublished opinion);
United States v. Atkins, 661 F. Supp. 491, 495-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (no loss deductions allowed
for fictitious or bogus transactions despite provisions in the 1984 and 1986 Tax Reform Acts
because the statutes do not permit tax deductions for fictitious or bogus transactions).
264. 861 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1988).
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least (a relevant qualification, as we shall see), a transaction that lacks
economic substance. Its only rationale is tax avoidance. ' '2 5 According
to Judge Posner, if some people would enter a transaction without a
tax motive, then the same transaction entered strictly for tax reasons
would still have economic substance. However, section 165(c)(2) would
allow a loss deduction only if the taxpayer entered into the transaction
for profit, interpreted as requiring a primary nontax motive. 2c Here
"there was no nontax profit motive and the transactions did not impinge on the world." 267 While the transactions were not fake in the
Forseth sense, they were artifices or shams because the taxpayers
assumed no market risks. Because the taxpayers had no possibility of
gain or loss, Judge Posner concluded that the transactions lacked
substance. The taxpayers were simply purchasing tax losses.
Viewed in its entirety, Judge Posner's opinion reflects a tendency,
found also in other opinions, to intertwine an analysis of the transaction's economic substance with an investigation of the taxpayer's motive. This motive analysis is unnecessary and can produce confusion.
Under the substance of the transaction test recommended in this article, courts should separate, instead of merge, the objective and
subjective inquiries. The judiciary should limit the sham transaction
doctrine to an inquiry regarding the substance of the transaction.
Here, Judge Posner's concern with the possibility of gain or loss on
the transaction, or the existence of economic risk, is important. Any
inquiry into profit motive, however, is relevant only to a second question, separate from the sham transaction doctrine. In the case of
straddles, the question of profit motive becomes relevant through the
question of statutory interpretation in determining what losses are
deductible under section 165(c)(2). Tied in with the question of the
interpretation of that general statutory provision is the impact of more
specialized straddle provisions, such as those enacted in the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA).
In the case of straddles, the specific legislative developments are
extremely relevant to the appropriate scope of the sham transaction
doctrine. Congress perceived a massive continuing tax shelter problem
involving straddles. Because the courts were not dealing adequately

265. Id. at 499.
266. Id. at 499-501. Judge Posner's opinion for the Seventh Circuit seems both to endorse

the "primarily for profit" test and to question whether a more objective test might be preferable:
"[d]espite this growing phalanx of authority, the objective test, strongly urged by the taxpayers
in this case, has much to recommend it [since judges can't weigh motives]." Id. at 501. The
transactions in Yosha met neither the objective nor the subjective tests. Id. at 502.
267.

Id. at 499.
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with the problem, Congress initiated legislation to restrain taxpayers.
In ERTA, Congress enacted a multi-faceted approach to restrict perceived tax shelter abuses inherent in straddle transactions. The Joint
Committee on Taxation announced that "[f]undamentally, the new
rules require that commodity futures transactions be taxed on their
economic substance. '' 268 Congress selected the particular provisions
with that aim. 269 The substance of the transaction test is especially
sensible in the area of commodity straddles, in light of the specific
statutory provisions and the legislative history outlined above.- ° Congress has indicated when it intends courts to make a profit motive
inquiry, as in section 165(c)(2), and in section 108 of the Tax Reform
Act of 1984, and section 1808 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. An
investigation of profit motive in the context of the sham transaction
doctrine is unnecessary and diverts attention from the crucial question,
namely, what is the substance of the transaction? This approach provides an objective inquiry that the courts can analyze independent of
a profit motive inquiry. Moreover, the deluge of litigation involving
straddles in the 1980s27 illustrates the fundamental necessity of
targeted, precise statutory provisions restricting straddles, such as
those enacted in ERTA. This flood of litigation also demonstrates the
basic inefficiency of leaving resolution of the massive tax shelter problem to the courts, armed only with judicial doctrines such as the sham
transaction doctrine. The weakness of relying on a judicial approach
would be exacerbated by utilizing an evaluation of taxpayers' motives
instead of focusing on a substance of the transaction analysis. Despite
the recent flurry of legislative activity, courts will still need to consider
the substance of the transaction doctrine in the straddle context, in
at least three different situations: 1) where particular statutory provi-

268. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, 283 (Jt. Comm. Print 1981).
For description of the numerous provisions enacted in 1981 to restrict tax shelters involving
straddles, see id. at 279-315. In its introduction, the Joint Committee on Taxation wrote that
"[ifn adding specific statutory rules in the Act to govern the taxation of straddle transactions,
the Congress has supplemented the prior law, generally without changing or reinterpreting
those rules which remain in effect." Id. at 279. Moreover, according to the Joint Committee,
"[t]he seriousness of these dangers [revenue losses and undermining of integrity of self-assessment system] made it unwise to wait for a final judicial resolution of taxpayer-government
disputes about the proper tax treatment of those transactions and imperative to eliminate any
uncertainty about the tax rules for the future." Id. at 294.
269. For example, § 1092 denies loss deductions with respect to commodities straddles
except to the extent that losses exceed unrealized gains on offsetting straddle positions.
270. See supra notes 260 & 268 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 250 (estimating 25,000 straddle cases pending in 1988).
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sions are inapplicable, as where they are prospective only; 2) where
holes or loopholes are left in statutory coverage; and 3) even if the
statute is applicable, where the question is whether the substance of
the transaction conforms to the form selected by the taxpayer. In this
last category, where the sham transaction doctrine has long coexisted
with other specific statutory provisions, it is especially important to
follow the approach advocated in this article, and focus on the substance of the transaction.
F.

Other Situations Involving Use of the Sham TransactionDoctrine

A review of several additional situations in which courts have recently invoked the sham transaction doctrine lends support for this
article's recommendation of limiting the scope of the doctrine to an
analysis of the substance of the transaction. In many of these additional
examples, courts used the sham transaction doctrine to thwart taxpayer efforts to take advantage of favorable statutory provisions
through formal compliance, when the substance of the underlying
transaction was not commensurate with its form. In these situations,
courts should require that the tax effects be tailored to the substance
of the transaction rather than the form. Analysis of the taxpayer's
motive or purpose should only become a part of this determination
when Congress has specified.
In one recent case, McNamara v. Commissioner,272 the Seventh
Circuit used the sham transaction doctrine to determine whether a
noncorporate lessor could claim an investment tax credit. Section
46(e)(3) limited the credit to situations when the lease term and options
were less than 50 percent of the useful life of the property. The court
concluded that it should respect the form arranged by the taxpayer,
a lease of less than 50 percent of the useful life, where the transaction
was not primarily tax motivated, unless the lease was a sham. ' 3 The
court defined a sham as a situation where, notwithstanding the use
of the lease form, there was a real shifting of all economic risk to the
lessee from the lessor.224 In other words, the court applied the sham
transaction doctrine to require that the lease form must in substance
be a lease and not a sale, if it is to be respected for tax purposes.
Under the framework proposed in this article, the substance of the
transaction should be the test; if the arrangement is in fact a lease of

272.
273.
274.

827 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 172.
Id.
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less than 50 percent of the useful life, then the court should respect
the form regardless of the taxpayer's intent in undertaking the transaction.
A similar example in a different context involved an attempt to
take advantage of the then applicable provisions of section
1253(d)(2)(B)(ii), regarding deduction of installment payments made in
purchasing a franchise distributorship. In Moore v. Commissioner,25
the Tax Court concluded that a territorial franchise arrangement was
a sham, spurious, and "rested on quicksand."' The Tax Court noted
the transactions had no business purpose, that they were not within
the scope of activities which Congress intended to protect under section 1253, and that the actions of the parties indicated the transactions
involving the franchise had no substance. Important to the court's
conclusion were the facts that the parties did not take their agreement
seriously, that the court did not believe the taxpayer's explanations,
that the taxpayer had never investigated the business aspects of the
franchise, that the court did not believe that the taxpayer intended
to pay the notes involved, and that the court found the transactions
were a disguise. 8 This example firmly demonstrates that room exists
for a judicial evaluation of the substance of the transaction when a
taxpayer attempts to take advantage of particular statutory provisions.
Under the framework proposed in this article, judicial evaluation
should focus on what the taxpayer was really doing, i.e., did the form
of the transaction (here, a franchise arrangement) in fact reflect the
substance of the transaction? If in substance the taxpayer did engage
in a purchase of a franchise, then the tax effects flowing from the
statutory provisions should apply without any inquiry into the taxpayer's motive. In both Moore and McNamara, an analysis of motive
would be appropriate only if called for by the particular statutory
provisions.
Another example of the use of the sham transaction doctrine in a
rather different context is Boyter v. Commissioner.2 There the court
invoked the sham transaction doctrine to determine whether taxpayers
could take advantage of favorable rates available to single taxpayers
where they had divorced at the end of the tax year and remarried

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

85 T.C. 72 (1985).
Id. at 101.
Id. at 102-04.
Id. at 106-07.
668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981).
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shortly thereafter in the next tax year.28 The Fourth Circuit indicated
that "the sham transaction doctrine may apply in this case if, as the
record suggests, the parties intended merely to procure divorce papers
rather than actually to effect a real dissolution of their marriage contract."8 1 The court's language suggests both a substance over form
analysis and an inquiry into the intent of the taxpayers. Under the
proposed substance of the transaction test, the appropriate question
to ask is whether the taxpayers' divorces were real or simply formal,
regardless of the taxpayers' intent. This question presents some difficulty in terms of identifying the appropriate scope for consideration.
On the one hand, looking simply at the divorces, it is possible to
conclude that there could be real, significant, and permanent effects
from the dissolution of the marriages.2 On the other hand, considering
the transactions in their entirety, there were no significant long-term
effects on their situations apart from the disputed tax consequences.
The subsequent actions of remarriages deprived the (arguably valid)
divorces of any substance, because the taxpayers in effect were continuously married, notwithstanding the apparent hiatus of a few
months, (at least under a broad-based view of the substance of the
transactions). In substance, the court could view the later events of
remarriages as confirming that the transactions' form did not conform
to their substance. Determining the appropriate scope for consideration is a problem also frequently involved in the step transaction
doctrine, when courts must decide whether to view steps of a transaction separately or to view the transaction as an integrated whole.
The thrust of the proposed framework, to analyze the substance of
the transaction, is not at all inconsistent with the basis for the step
transaction doctrine.
Courts have considered other doctrines in conjunction with the
sham transaction doctrine in numerous other recent cases. Packard
v. Commissionerm involved a taxpayer that accrued substantial tax
280.

Id. at 1382-85. The taxpayers' pattern was to divorce at year end in a Caribbean

country where divorces could be easily procured, and remarry at the beginning of the next tax
year; this was repeated in the following tax year. Since the filing status is determined according
to the marital status on the last day of the tax year, this arrangement if respected would permit

application of single taxpayer rates, which were lower than married taxpayer rates.
281.

Id. at 1387.

282. Another issue concerned validity of the divorces under the relevant state law. The
majority felt that this question was not necessary to answer, since if the divorces were shams
under federal law they would not be respected for federal tax purposes. Id. at 1385-86: The

dissent, however, felt that the first question for determination was whether the divorces were
valid under state law, a question which had not yet been definitively answered by the state
courts. Id. at 1388-89 (Widener, J., dissenting).
283. 85 T.C. 397 (1985).
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losses due to prepaid feed expenditures. These losses offset gain derived from liquidation of a separate company. The Tax Court concluded
that the arrangement withstood the sham transaction doctrine as formulated in Rice's Toyota World because the cattle feed operation had
a business purpose and the transaction had economic substance in the
form of genuine indebtedness and possible economic benefits.2 After
finding that the transaction was not a sham, the court then applied
the step transaction doctrine to consider the various steps as an integrated whole. The taxpayer had initially used a Subchapter S Corporation as the vehicle for entering the cattle feed investment, but soon
liquidated that investment and transferred the corporation's assets to
a partnership. The Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer had no
valid business reason for using the Subchapter S Corporation instead
of the ultimate partnership. The court then recast the transaction as
if originally undertaken by the partnership to reflect the substance of
the transaction.2 This combination of approaches resulted in the taxpayer paying taxes in accordance with the substance of the transaction.2
The court in Bystry v. United States2 also used a combination of
approaches in deciding whether to disregard the corporate form chosen
by the taxpayer. This case illustrates convergence with the doctrine
established in Moline Properties, Inc. v. CommissionerM where the
Supreme Court determined that as long as the purpose for the corporation "is the equivalent of business activity or is followed by the
carrying on of business by the corporation, the corporation remains a
separate taxable entity. '" However, under the corporate entity doctrine of Moline, courts would still disregard the corporate form where
it is a sham or unreal. In Bystry, the corporation had no assets, no
action was taken on behalf of the corporation except completing pre-

284.
285.
286.

Id. at 417-19.
Id. at 421-22.
In particular, the court decided that (1) the transaction was not a sham, (2) applying

the step-transaction doctrine, the court would ignore the intermediate step of utilizing a Subchapter S Corporation and thus ignore the attempted step-up in basis, and (3) the taxpayer would
be allowed a deduction for prepaid feed expenses because the taxpayer had satisfied the threepart test established earlier by the Tax Court in Van Raden v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1083,
1096 (1979) (permitting a deduction for prepaid feed only if the expenditure was a payment,

the prepayment was for a business purpose and not only to reduce taxes, and a material
distortion of income was not caused by the deduction), affd, 650 F.2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1981).
287. 596 F. Supp. 574 (W.D. Wisc. 1984).
288. 319 U.S. 486 (1943).

289.

Id. at 438-39.
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requisites for incorporation and the filing of tax returns, and the
corporation did not hold itself out as operating the farm in question. °
Hence, the court concluded that the corporate form was a sham to be
disregarded and that the involved individuals should report the income
along with other tax attributes in their individual capacity. Again, the
court should view this inquiry under a substance of the transaction
analysis. In reality, were the corporation or the individuals conducting
the business? Whether termed a sham transaction analysis or a disregard of the corporate entity, the underlying analysis is identical: Did
the form chosen by the taxpayers correspond to the substance of the
transaction?21
A final example is suggested by the transaction and analysis undertaken in Saviano v. Commissioner.m In this case, a taxpayer sought
to deduct mining expenses amounting to $30,000 which were incurred
in connection with a mineral lease. The taxpayer had obtained that
money to pay the expenses through a nonrecourse 'loan" from the
entity which secured the mineral lease for him. The sole security for
the loan was a general lien on the mineral lease. The Seventh Circuit
analyzed the economic substance of the transaction, focusing on the
allocation of risk and the nature of the possibilities of repayment of
the loan, and concluded that the loan was really a joint investment
and that the form was misleading and a ruse.2 3 In effect, the court
equated the sham transaction doctrine with the doctrine of substance
over form and concluded that the form did not warrant respect where
the underlying transaction was really a joint investment.2

290. Bystry, 596 F. Supp. at 578-80.
291. Cf. Commissioner v. Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. 1173 (1988) (applying in effect a substance
of the transaction test in determining whether a corporation should be treated as a separate
taxable entity or as a nontaxable agent of its partnership principal).
292. 765 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1985).
293. Id. at 654.
294. Id. at 650. Similarly, the court analyzed a transaction in a subsequent tax year involving
a gold option plan (chosen by the taxpayer because Congress had eliminated the desirability of
the mineral lease arrangement selected for the prior year). The substance of the transaction
was not a true option. Thus, the court required the taxpayer to report currently the income
involved. Id. at 654. In concluding its opinion, the Seventh Circuit wrote that
[o]nly a fool would actually believe that the transactions did in fact occur as described. The many elements of commercial surrealism present in these tax shelters
should have put a reasonable person on notice that he was not being shown all the
cards in the deck ....
The freedom to arrange one's affairs to minimize taxes does not include the
right to engage in financial fantasies with the expectation that the Internal Revenue
Service and the courts will play along. The Commissioner and the courts are
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These various examples of transactions and differing combined approaches which the courts take suggest several conclusions. First,
courts should refashion the sham transaction doctrine as suggested
throughout this article as a doctrine requiring that the substance of
the transaction govern. Second, many situations exist where the courts
have utilized other doctrines to analyze transactions involving similar
circumstances to the sham transaction doctrine. In many of these
cases, the court does in fact utilize the substance of the transaction
analysis, regardless of the particular phraseology chosen. Third, the
key to the substance of the transaction analysis is its content. Courts
can best give proper content to their analysis by evaluating the particular aspects of the subject area, as this article has done above in
surveying the different subject areas in which courts historically have
invoked the sham transaction doctrine.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The critical judicial analysis should be the determination of the
substance of the transaction. In effect, many courts have undertaken
such an analysis when invoking the sham transaction doctrine. But,
some courts have intertwined the substance of the transaction analysis
with an investigation of motive or business purpose. Others have used
the doctrine to avoid hard analysis and to engage in labeling.
The Supreme Court has failed to provide sufficient content for the
sham transaction doctrine in its three basic precedents of Gregory,
Knetsch, and Frank Lyon. The lower courts, instead of developing a
coherent theory, have mingled the strands of the sham transaction doctrine in unpredictable fashion. When the current problem areas are
examined, the proper strand of analysis is clearly evident: Courts
should focus on developing criteria for evaluating the substance of the
transaction. The content of this test will be shaped by the particular
nature of the specific problem involved, as illustrated in part V of
this article. Courts should consider taxpayer motives only where Congress has indicated a motive-based analysis is appropriate.

empowered, and in fact duty bound, to look beyond the contrived forms of transactions to their economic substance and to apply the tax laws accordingly.

Id. at 654.
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